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Preface 
 
This is the fourth study carried out by a voluntary group of researchers from several countries. 
The aim of all their studies has been to develop approaches and methodologies for comparing 
tax and benefit systems across countries. In particular, the studies have aimed at examining 
incentives to work embedded in tax and benefit systems and finding tools through 
comparative analyses for assessing these incentives or disincentives and their impact on 
labour market outcomes. 
 
This project has been managed and carried out in a way that has already been successfully 
applied in the previous studies of the group. Participants in the group combine their efforts in 
order to agree on a common methodology and to carry out necessary calculations by 
themselves in each country. This allows the combination of in-depth understanding of 
national circumstances and good international comparability, leading to high-quality results. 
Notably, these results have made it possible to take steps forward in cross-country 
comparisons from traditional descriptive analyses on tax and benefit systems. 
 
The first two studies
1 focused on incentives to work embedded in unemployment benefit and 
means-tested benefit schemes together with taxation, calculated as net replacement rates. 
These studies were among pilot studies focusing on international comparability of tax and 
benefit schemes. As a result, they stimulated broader interest in this kind of study. Notably, in 
the mid-1990s, the OECD regularly started to calculate net replacement rates covering a large 
set of countries, today including all the OECD member countries. The third study
2 dealt with 
incentive problems embedded in early retirement schemes, influencing the withdrawal of 
older workers from the labour market. 
 
This study aims at tackling benefit receipt more broadly and at investigating mechanisms in 
tax-benefit entitlements that may lead to longer-term benefit dependency. It looks at the 
dynamics of benefit systems and is based upon hypothetical routes through which people may 
move from one benefit to another. Hence, the duration of benefit in combination with the 
benefit level is a particular focus of this study. At the same time, it aims at examining whether 
these incentives change if the receipt of benefits is prolonged. 
 
The research presented in this study has benefited from the contributions of: 
Ms. Rita Di Biase and Mr. Aldo Gandiglio, Institute for Studies and Economic Analyses, 
Italy. 
Ms. Sabine Desczka, Mr. Hans Metz and Ms. Ellen Siegelaar, Dutch Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Employment. 
Mr. David Haigh, Department for Work and Pensions, the United Kingdom. 
Mr. Hans Hansen and Mr. Morten Frederiksen, Danish National Institute of Social Research. 
Mr. Lars Erik Lindholm, Swedish Ministry of Finance. 
Mr. Esko Mustonen, Government Institute for Economic Research, Finland. 
                                                 
1 Einerhand, M, I. Eriksson and H. Hansen (1993), ‘Unemployment Insurance in the Netherlands, Denmark and 
Sweden’, The Hague, the Netherlands 
Seven Countries Group (1995), ‘Unemployment Benefits and Social Assistance in seven European Countries’, 
Werkdokumenten no. 10, Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, the Netherlands. 
2 Eight Countries Group (1997), ‘Income benefits for Early Exit from the Labour Market in eight European 
Countries. A comparative study’, Werkdokumenten no. 61, Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 
the Netherlands. This study has also been published in the European Economy, Reports and Studies no. 3, 
European Commission 1998.  
- 3 - 
 
Mr. Luis Peragon, Spanish Ministry of Finance. 
 
The secretariat of the OECD and the services of the European Commission participated in the 
study as observers. The authors would like to thank Mr. Mark Pearson (Social Policy 
Division, OECD) and Ms. Aino Salomäki (DG Economic and Financial Affairs, European 
Commission) for their contributions and constructive comments. The latter also wrote the 
executive summary and the section on participation, employment and benefit receipt. 
 
The contents of this study are the exclusive responsibility of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the ministries, government agencies, research institutes or the 
European Commission where they work. 
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A generally acknowledged problem of tax and benefit systems is the trade-off between the 
equity and security objective of social benefit systems and the efficiency objective of the 
labour market. Studies also suggest that benefit receipt among the working-age population is 
much larger than what the mere unemployment figures would imply. This may involve some 
benefits acting as a substitute for unemployment benefit, if take-up is allowed for long 
periods. A long duration of benefit receipt involves a risk of deterioration of skills and, 
consequently, a fall out from the labour market and dependency on benefits. Such benefits 
received in non-employment - the case where the requirements for the participation in the 
labour market do not apply - reduce potential labour supply. 
 
This study aims at examining benefit levels relative to the income gained from work with a 
special focus on the time dimension of benefit receipt. Whether and when the level of benefits 
changes if its receipt is prolonged and whether it is possible to move from the receipt of one 
benefit to another in certain circumstances are central questions. Thus, the study tries to find 
out the dynamics and mechanisms of benefit systems, which may lead to longer-term benefit 
dependency. For this purpose, a number of hypothetical routes for exiting the labour market, 
notably through unemployment, and a route to return to the labour market after 
unemployment have been defined. The benefit level in each of these stages is studied and 
compared to the income level when in work. Further, the entitlement for the duration of 
benefits and possible disincentives to return to work and incentives to stay on benefits are 
looked at. 
 
Four benefit routes have been examined in this study: 
(i) Activation route, on which one becomes unemployed, participates in active labour market 
programmes, and finally re-enters employment; 
(ii) Long-term unemployment and social exclusion route, on which one becomes unemployed, 
continues to stay on benefits as long as it is possible, becomes long-term unemployed when 
unemployment insurance benefit expires, and ends up on a last-resort benefit scheme; 
(iii) Early retirement route, to which one may come through unemployment or directly from 
employment. The route through unemployment is examined here, but when that is not 
possible the route goes from employment to early retirement; 
(iv)  Sickness and  disability route, to which one may come from employment when this 
benefit is used as a substitution for early retirement, or genuinely through a sickness case. 
 
This study was carried out by a voluntary group of researchers from Denmark, Finland, Great 
Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. The results of this study compare the 




As regards the activation route, in most countries there are no additional financial incentives 
for participation in activation programmes; the net replacement rates are the same as when 
people are on unemployment benefits. Italy and the Netherlands do provide higher benefits 
when the unemployed participate in activation programmes and thusprovide additional 
financial incentives for activation. In Great Britain, there is only one joint benefit, which can 
be considered as an activation benefit rather than just an unemployment benefit, due to its 
strict requirement of participation in an activation programme. Spain provides no specific  
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benefit to promote participation. Hence, it is very important to look at the requirements for 
availability for labour markets and for participation in activation programmes as financial 
incentives are largely missing. 
 
The Netherlands, Great Britain and Denmark provide stronger incentives for young persons to 
participate in activation programmes instead of staying on unemployment benefit, notably 
through strict requirements for participation and reduced (or abolished) benefits for 
unemployment alone. In particular Denmark, while combining duties and rights, requires that 
young unemployed persons who do not have an education qualification must enrol into an 
education program in order to be eligible for 'fair' benefits. In the case where they choose a 
labour market training programme, the benefit is low. Hence, this encourages young people to 
choose ordinary education instead of an activation programme. 
 
The replacement rates are higher for low-wage than average earners both in activation and in 
unemployment in all countries. This reflects the aim of providing a decent income level when 
out of work, irrespective of the former wage level. However, it reduces the net gain that one 
can have when moving back to work from unemployment, in other words, the incentives to 
work are weak. Incentives to return to work at a lower wage level than what one had before 
unemployment are weak, in particular for low-wage earners. This points to the issue of the 
duration of unemployment benefits and of the requirements for participation in the labour 
market. 
 
Long-term unemployment and social exclusion route 
The duration of unemployment benefits varies largely across countries and additionally, in 
Spain and the Netherlands, according to the period during which one has paid contributions to 
the scheme.  After a period of varying length, when the eligibility for unemployment benefit 
expires, the unemployed person usually qualifies for social assistance or unemployment 
assistance. Social assistance is the exit scheme in all countries except in Finland, Great Britain 
and Spain. In Finland, the unemployed person is entitled to labour market support, while the 
exit scheme in Spain is unemployment assistance and in Great Britain means-tested 
Jobseekers Allowance. 
 
The insurance scheme is aimed at short to medium term unemployment, while the exit scheme 
is provided for a longer period, usually without any time limit. The long-term exit scheme 
results in higher replacement rates than the insurance scheme in many countries, especially at 
low wage levels, but for some family types also at average wage levels. As regards incentives 
to work, this seems to be a problem in many countries. The continuation of unemployment 
only affects the level of net replacement rates to a small degree, especially at low wage levels. 
An additional incentive problem associated with social assistance is that it does not generally 
require availability for the labour market. In most countries, the level of social assistance is 
comparable to the level of unemployment benefit at 67 per cent of the average wage level. 
 
Early retirement route 
Early retirement results in higher net replacement rates than unemployment benefit in most 
countries, both at low and average wage levels, with the most striking gains in Italy and Great 
Britain. In Sweden there is always a lower rate. For a single person, incentive problems in 
relation to work are clear in Italy and the Netherlands. Also for a one-earner couple and the 
low-earner spouse in a two-earner couple, the incentives for early retirement are very strong at 
lower income levels in most countries. This is also the case for the primary earner spouse at  
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low-income levels in Denmark, and to some extent over a broader income range in the 
Netherlands, Italy and Spain. 
 
Furthermore, when assessing early retirement schemes relative to unemployment benefits, one 
has to bear in mind that the early pension is usually granted for a longer period of time and 
that the requirements concerning labour market availability are weak or absent. Thus, 
particularly where unemployment has continued for some time and the prospects of a return to 
employment are weak, early retirement schemes can become very attractive. 
 
Sickness and disability route 
Compared to other schemes, sickness and disability schemes yield the highest replacement 
rates. Replacement rates show that in many cases net income is even higher than that from the 
previous wage. This gives reason to ask whether such a high compensation is justified and 
draws attention to eligibility rules and proper administration of such schemes; a lax 
administration may lead to extensive use of such schemes, allowing a lax interpretation of 
proper eligibility rules. On the other hand, with regard to incentives that stimulate work, one 
has to keep in mind that disability is due to medical conditions, in most cases not conditions 
that can be much influenced by the individual. 
 
In general, countries that regard the disability scheme as a pension scheme have higher 
replacement rates. These schemes are designed in such a way that people are not expected to 
return to work. Often, they also offer benefits that may be higher than those offered to people 





This study demonstrates that the incentive structure embedded in benefit and tax schemes is a 
broader issue than the net replacement rate alone and for each benefit at a time. The duration 
of benefit is an important part of the incentive structure, as well as the possibility of moving 
to another benefit if a benefit expires. The calculations show that the continuation of 
unemployment only has a small effect on the level of net replacement rates, especially at low 
wage levels, even if a person becomes long-term unemployed and dependant on the last-resort 
benefit scheme. It is also a cause for concern that most countries do not provide any financial 
incentives to participate in activation programmes, and that this may not always be combined 
with strict requirements as regards participation. This points to the importance of 
requirements regarding labour market participation. 
 
As far as benefits in the case of withdrawal from the labour market to inactivity are 
concerned, the study suggests that the incentive structures deserve a revisit. Early retirement 
schemes do provide financial incentives to withdraw from the labour market instead of being 
unemployed. In addition, the absence of requirements for labour market availability and the 
fact that these benefits are usually granted for a relatively long period of time, increase the 
attractiveness of these schemes. Thus, they are likely to work as substitutes for unemployment 
benefits and reduce effective labour supply. The results of the calculations concerning the 
sickness and disability route point to the issue of a sound administration of benefits and their 
proper eligibility rules with the aim that these schemes would not be overly used, despite their 
higher compensation level. 
  




The European Union is committed to ambitious goals as regards its competitiveness, 
economic growth, employment creation and social cohesion in the conclusions of the 
European Council in Lisbon. Accordingly, policy co-ordination has been strengthened, 
notably in the fields of economic policies, structural reforms and labour market policies. 
Furthermore, as regards social policy aims, co-operation between Member States is increasing 
and common policy goals are being set, in particular in the fields of social inclusion and 
pension policies. In both of these areas the interaction with employment policies is of utmost 
importance. As stated in many reports, the best guarantee against social exclusion is a job and 
staying longer in work helps to maintain one’s living standard as well as to cope with 
increasing pressures for future pension expenditure. 
 
However, the current situation regarding labour force participation, employment and 
unemployment is not yet satisfactory in many European countries, despite clear improvements 
during the latter part of the 1990s. For instance, the European unemployment rate has come 
down from its peak of 11.1% in 1994 to 7.7% in 2001. During the same period, however, the 
increase in labour supply was more subdued, by only 2 percentage points from 67.2% to 
69.2%. When this and the current employment rate of 64% are compared to the EU target for 
the employment rate of 70% by 2010, it is evident that reforms have to be continued in order 
to raise participation and employment rates and to tackle the structural problems that still 
remain. The structural problems include uneven distribution of participation in the labour 
market, uneven unemployment rates across social groups and age groups, as well as different 
skill levels and a major part of unemployment being structural in nature. In addition, 
European countries suffer from high levels of taxes and benefits, which cause disincentives to 
work, thereby reducing potential labour supply, and encouraging dependency on benefits 
among the working-age population, because generous benefit levels and long duration are 
common. 
 
In the framework of the Employment process Member States have committed themselves to 
structural reforms, including reforms of benefit systems to make work pay so that the overall 
incentive structure in tax and benefit systems favours employment, and moving from passive 
income support towards active measures designed to get people back to work. Thus, social 
protection systems should become instruments of employment promotion and help labour 
markets and social systems adapt in mutually supporting ways. In this process the whole 
incentive structure, which is considered to include benefit levels, benefit duration, eligibility 
rules and job availability rules, becomes very important. 
 
This study has been motivated by the general acknowledgement of problems, which appear as 
a trade-off between the equity and security objective of social benefit systems and the 
efficiency objective of the labour market. It has also been stimulated by the observations that 
benefit receipt among the working-age population is much larger than the mere 
unemployment figures would infer. This suggests that some benefits may act as substitutes for 
unemployment benefit, if take-up is allowed for long periods. A long duration of benefit 
receipt creates a risk of skills deterioration and, consequently, a fall out from the labour 
market and dependency on benefits. Such benefits received in non-employment - that is in the 
case where the requirement  of labour market availability does not apply - reduce potential 
labour supply. In addition, benefit dependency constitutes a major burden on public finances, 
and, on the part of individuals, it prohibits participating fully in society, thereby increasing the 
risk of social exclusion.  
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This study aims to investigate incentive structures in tax and benefit schemes in a broader 
sense than what looking at mere benefit levels can reveal. In particular, it aims to investigate 
the possible additional impact of the duration of benefits on the overall generosity of benefits. 
It also tries to find out whether benefit systems provide the possibility of moving from one 
benefit to another, thus providing routes to a final withdrawal from the labour market. As a 
comparison, incentive structures for a return to employment through active labour market 
programmes are also examined. The authors hope that this study provides a contribution to 
the discussion on the changes in social protection, whether already done or still required, with 
the determined aim of gearing social protection systems to stimulate employment. 
 
This paper is structured in the following way: Chapter 2 discusses some facts about the 
current situation and recent developments regarding the functioning of labour markets and the 
extent of benefit provision. Chapter 3 describes the methodology and some necessary 
assumptions of this study. Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 present the results of this study for the 
selected benefit routes: activation route (4), long-term unemployment and social exclusion 
route (5), early retirement route (6), and sickness and disability route (7).  
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2 Participation, employment and benefit receipt. Facts and developments 
 
Despite favourable economic development and an improved level of employment during the 
latter part of the 1990s, unemployment is still at an unacceptably high level in many European 
countries and public spending on cash benefits remains high. Unemployment is often 
considered a primary cause for claiming benefits when one is at the working age and able to 
work. However, the levels and developments of unemployment rates alone cannot explain 
benefit spending to the working-age population. Notwithstanding this, long-term 
unemployment is an important cause for concern because it can lead to dependency on 
benefits if the duration of benefit provision is long. 
 
It is claimed that long-term provision of benefits leads to increased use of these benefits and, 
consequently, benefit dependency and decreased employment and participation rates. The first 
graph shows the labour force participation and unemployment rates in the EU. 
 

















































Countries of this study marked in bold. 
 
This chart for 1994 has been presented to compare with the situation in 2001. Although the 
participation rates have increased in all countries since 1994 (except Sweden) and the 
unemployment rates have decreased in all countries (except Greece), it is worth noticing that 
the relation between these rates has remained relatively similar in essence. Countries with 
high participation rates tend to also have low unemployment rates, and a low participation rate 
doesn’t seem to guarantee a low unemployment rate. This development seems to have 
strengthened during the latter part of the 1990s, which can be seen in the second picture as a 
more distinct concentration towards the line from the upper left-hand corner to the lower 
right-hand corner. These figures suggest that a reduction in unemployment rates is not 
reached by reducing labour supply in general. On the contrary, high labour supply seems to be 
beneficial for job creation and employment rates. The mechanism which is supposed to 
support this outcome is that increased labour supply, if not accompanied immediately by 
increased demand for labour, reduces inflation, which in turn leads to an increase in aggregate 
demand, and consequently to an increase in labour demand, which results in higher  
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employment rates. This lesson is of particular importance when policies for early retirement 
are considered and applied as in the past to help to cope with high levels of unemployment. 
 
















































Countries of this study are marked in bold. 
 
 
Second, we look at the relationship between the employment rate and benefit spending. It can 
be seen that the relationship between these two indicators is not straightforward. In general, a 
low level of benefit spending as a share of GDP does not seem to correlate with high 
employment rates (graph 2.3). In fact, many countries with high employment rates such as 
Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands spend the highest shares of GDP in benefits to 
working-age population. At the other end of the scale, in Italy, Greece and Spain, low 
employment rates are accompanied by low benefit spending. A number of facts such as 
benefit level and entitlement, whether benefit is based on the individual or the household, as 
well as distribution of benefits between men and women may largely have affected these 
figures. For instance, a high level of benefit for a small number of recipients can result in a 
high spending as a share of GDP, even combined with a high employment rate. On the other 
hand, a low employment rate may be accompanied by low benefit spending, if the entitlement 
of individual benefits is strictly limited, as is the case in some countries as regards the benefit 
entitlement of women when unemployed or non-employed.  
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Source: Eurostat, Social Protection Database (ESSPROS). 
(1) Includes disability benefits, unemployment benefits and social assistance. 
 
More insight intothe relationship between benefit receipt and employment is provided by 
benefit dependency figures, as it measures their interrelationship in terms of the number of 
individuals both as benefit recipients and as employed, thus eliminating the impact of the 
benefit level on the relationship. Benefit dependency is defined as the total number of persons 
receiving social security benefits relative to the working-age population. The Netherlands 
Economic Institute (NEI) has developed this approach
3. When measuring benefit dependency 
among the working-age population, it is appropriate to limit the benefit receipt to those of 
working age, thus excluding old-age pensions and other benefits granted to the elderly. In the 
NEI study, the number of benefit recipients is expressed in so-called benefit years, meaning 
that it is calculated on the basis of full-time equivalents for those depending on social 
benefits. In other words, two part-time benefit recipients, when each of them receives benefit 
for half a year, makes one benefit year. 
 
                                                 
3 Netherlands Economic Institute (1999), ’Benefit Dependency Ratios. An analysis of nine European Countries, 
Japan and the US ’, study commissioned by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the Netherlands.  
Netherlands Economic Institute (2002), ’Benefit Dependency Ratios by Gender. An International Comparison’, 
study commissioned by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the Netherlands. 
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Source: Netherlands Economic Institute (2002), Benefit dependency ratios by gender. 
 
 
The interrelationship between benefit dependency and the employment rate shows the 
expected trend; higher benefit dependency figures are accompanied by lower employment 
rates and lower benefit dependency by higher employment rates. However, Spain remains an 
outlier among the countries examined; both benefit dependency and the employment rates are 
low. 
 
Third, we look at some groups of people who are likely to receive benefits and are exposed to 
benefit dependency. Unemployment is one reason for claiming benefits. We look at the 
distribution of unemployment between the most vulnerable groups of people, namely young 
people, women and older workers. In addition, long-term unemployment, defined as an 
unemployment durationof at least 12 months, is of particular interest for this study. Long-term 
unemployment represents a possible case for long-term benefit receipt, which exposes benefit 
dependency. Another reason for long-term benefit receipt is an early retirement arrangement. 
A person in receipt of an early pension is not required to be available for the labour market, 
and thus it represents the case of non-employment in which benefit is received. Hence, the 
relevant scope for examining incentives to work broadens from unemployment to non-
employment. 
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Table 2.1 Unemployment rates in 2001 




Denmark DK  4.3  4.9 8.5 4.0 0.9
Finland FIN  9.1  9.7 19.7 9.0 2.5
Great Britain GB  5.0  4.4 11.9 3.3 1.3
Italy IT  9.4  12.9 28.1 4.6 5.9
The Netherlands NL  2.4  3.0 5.5 1.4u 0.8
Spain SP  10.6  15.5 21.5 8.6 5.1
Sweden S  4.9  4.5 11.0 5.9 1.2
Belgium B  6.6  7.4 17.6 3.0 3.0
Germany D  7.7  7.8 8.2 12.0 3.9
Greece EL  10.5  15.6 28.1 4.1 5.4
France F  8.6  10.3 19.3 5.8 2.9
Ireland IRL  3.8  3.7 6.6 2.6u 1.3
Luxembourg L  2.0  2.4 7.5 u 0.5
Austria A  3.6  4.3 5.8 5.6 0.9
Portugal P  4.1  5.1 9.3 2.6u 1.5
EU15 7.4  8.6 14.7 6.8 3.2
Source: Eurostat (u= unreliable or uncertain data). 
 
The unemployment rate for EU was 7.4% in 2001 and varied largely across countries, from 
2.0% in Luxembourg and 2.4% in the Netherlands to 10.6% in Spain. Among the seven 
countries of this study, countries with both high and low unemployment rates are represented. 
The rates for certain sub-groups of people tell us about the concentration of unemployment. 
The reasons for concentration may be incentive issues but also other institutional issues, such 
as the existence of a problem between insiders and outsiders to the labour market. The 
unemployment rate for older workers is lower than the overall rate in almost all countries. 
This is an unexpected feature because this group is most exposed to problems of inadequate 
skills levels, due to lower level of education in general, and thus should be among the 
vulnerable groups of people. This leads us to look closer at the employment and participation 
rate of older workers and searching for possible incentive problems in benefit schemes other 
than for unemployment. 
 
All unemployment rates have come down from their peaks in 1994, the unemployment rate 
for the total labour force in the EU as a whole by 3.6 percentage points, for women by 3.8, for 
young people by 7.8 and for older workers by 1.8 percentage points. The long-term 
unemployment rate declined by 2 percentage points and its share of the total unemployment 
has reduced a bit, from 47% to 43%. This development can be partly attributed to the 
reinforced European employment policies, which draw strong attention to the activation of the 
unemployed and to the prevention of long-term unemployment. Notwithstanding this, the 
share of the long-term unemployed remains significant, thereby entitling a large number of 
people to benefits for long periods. In addition it should be noted that when preventive 
measures interfere, they interrupt the unemployment spell. Consequently, difficult 
unemployment appears today as unemployment recurring more frequently than in previous 
years. Thus, the current long-term unemployment rates may underestimate the seriousness of 
the unemployment problem. 
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The number of persons on an early pension is not easily available for all countries. A high 
number of such persons is, however, shown by other proxy indicators, for instance by the 
employment rate for older workers and the average age of withdrawal from the labour market. 
In all European countries except Sweden, the employment rate for older workers is far below 
the rate for the total labour force. At the same time, the unemployment rate for older workers 
is lower than for the total labour force in almost all countries (table 2.1.), thus indicating that 
the labour supply of older workers is low. 
 
It can be noticed from the graph 2.5 that there is no single model for the employment of older 
workers in European countries. In fact, the rates vary across countries far more than the total 
employment rates and do not follow the same ranking order as the overall employment rates. 
Belgium, Luxembourg, France and, notably, Austria have very low employment rates for 
older workers but rank in the middle for the overall employment rate. Also, the Netherlands, 
with one of the highest overall employment rates, falls close to the European average 
regarding the employment rate of older workers. These countries have the largest gaps in the 
employment rates between older workers and total labour force. 
 
During the latter part of the 1990s, progress in raising the employment rate of older workers 
can be observed in all countries except Greece and Italy. The progress has been fastest in 
Finland and the Netherlands and noticeable also in Ireland, Denmark and Spain. Partially, this 
reflects favourable economic developments, but also a change in policies. European countries 
have become more and more aware of the undesirable incentives in benefit and pension 
schemes for early withdrawal from the labour market. Consequently, policies have been 




- 16 - 
 














The average age of withdrawal from the labour market shows a mirror picture to the 
employment rate of older workers. In general, countries with the lowest employment rate for 
older workers also experience the lowest average age of withdrawal from the labour market, 
although the latter figure is estimated from the labour force participation figures of the age 
groups over 50. Strictly speaking, the average age of withdrawal from the labour market does 
not express the receipt of an early pension but only the exit from the labour market. However, 
the figure of a low age of withdrawal together with low unemployment rates for older workers 
reveal that the requirement for labour market availability is not strict. The easy availability of 
early pensions clearly contributes to this. It can be assumed that the figures for men reflect the 
availability of early pensions more than those for women, who in a number of countries have 
traditionally only been in the labour market to a limited extent. In the EU countries, on 
average, men withdrew from the labour market at the age of 60 and women at the age of 59 in 
2000, while the common statutory retirement age was 65 in almost all countries. 
 
The above figures tell us that there is still ample room for improvement in the functioning of 
the labour market. A high level of benefit spending to the working-age people and a large 
group of people in unemployment and inactivity while receiving benefits call for further 
examination of the mechanisms in benefit systems, the reform of which could render benefit 
systems more supportive to employment. We turn to this question in the following chapter. 
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3 Methodology and assumptions of this study 
 
This study aims to examine benefit levels relative to income gained from work, with a special 
focus on the time dimension of benefit receipt: whether and when the level of benefits 
changes if its receipt is prolonged, and whether it is possible to move from the receipt of one 
benefit to another in certain circumstances. For this purpose, a number of hypothetical routes 
out of the labour market through unemployment to long-term benefit dependency have been 
defined, and, as an alternative, an activation route back to employment. The benefit level in 
each of these stages is studied and compared with the income level when in work. Thus, 
possible disincentives to return to work and incentives to stay on benefits are looked at. 
 
The study has been carried out through an investigation of tax and benefit systems in each of 
the participating countries and through calculation of net replacement rates of different benefit 
schemes in selected situations. The calculations have been done by a stylised approach of 
micro simulations for a set of selected family types. In other words, the structure and outcome 
of the benefit and tax system in each country is analysed, as it appears on the basis of the 
entitlement to these benefits according to the legislation on a given date and assuming that the 




In this stylised approach, a number of hypothetical assumptions and selections have to be 
made. These include (i) the selection of the benchmark in terms of the wage level applied for 
each country’s calculations, (ii) selection of the family types for which the calculations will be 
done, (iii) selection of the benefit schemes, notably the means-tested ones, to be included in 
the calculations, (iv) some hypothetical assumptions which are needed for calculating certain 
benefits, notably assumptions on housing costs in order to calculate housing allowances. In 
addition, in this study, the hypothetical routes for benefit dependency or back to work have 
been defined. 
 
The benchmark of the wage level is decisive for the relevance of the calculations both for 
each country’s income distribution and for the cross-country comparison of the results. As it 
is already an established practice, the wage of an average production worker (APW) has been 
chosen as a benchmark, following the practise applied in the OECD’s tax/benefit calculations 
for an average worker
4. An income range below and above this average is defined as fractions 
of the average wage, with the aim of representing both low and high wage earners and 
covering the range between 67% of the APW to 150% of the APW wage. In addition to the 
benchmark (average) wage level, particular emphasis is given to a low wage level, which is 
chosen as 67% of the APW wage
5, in order to focus on the group of people to whom incentive 
problems are most likely to occur.  
 
                                                 
4 See, for instance, OECD (1995), ‘The Tax/Benefit Position of Production Workers, 1995 Edition’; OECD 
(1997), ‘Benefits and Incentives in OECD Countries. 1997 Edition’. 
5 According to an OECD study, based on the European Community Household Panel data, the average wage of 
those who lost employment was slightly above two thirds of average earnings as an average for a number of 
countries, whereas the wage that they got if they became employed after unemployment was somewhat below 
the two thirds level when calculated. In other words, the ‘low earnings’ assumption often made in stylised 
calculations is in fact a ‘typical’ wage of those who experience unemployment. (OECD (2000), ‘Income 
Changes when Moving in and out of Work’, Work document ELSA/WP1 (2000))  
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The family types used in this study are: 
−   A single person. 
−   A single parent with two children aged 3 and 6. 
−   A young single parent (age 22) with one child (age 3); this family type is used 
only for the activation route analysis. 
−   A one-earner couple without children. 
−   A two-earner couple with two children aged 3 and 6; the second earner is assumed 
to work part-time, always with a wage 50 per cent of the primary earner’s wage. 
−   A two-earner couple without children; this family type is used only for the early 
retirement route analysis. 
 
In the context of the receipt of different benefits, it becomes necessary to make assumptions 
of the age of the primary earner. The primary earner is assumed to be of middle age, 40 years 
old. However, active labour market policies, in particular, may differ from those targeted to 
prime-age workers for young people. In the activation route, young persons age 22 are also 
examined. In addition, early retirement is valid only for older workers.  The early retirement 
age of the primary earner varies from 52 (in Italy) to 61 (in Sweden and Finland) in the 
countries of this study. For the rest of the countries, the age is assumed to be 60 years. 
 
Net replacement rates  
 
The net replacement rate is a well-established indicator for measuring the unemployment trap. 
This trap is defined as a situation where benefits paid to the unemployed (or recipients of 
some other replacement benefit) and their families are high relative to earnings so that 
working “does not pay”. More precisely, the net replacement rate is calculated as a ratio of 
disposable income when out of work in comparison with the disposable income gained from 
work. This provides adequate information regarding the interaction of tax and benefit 
systems, because in addition to an exchange of wage into unemployment benefit, the different 
taxation treatment of wages and benefits and the entitlement to means-tested benefits are 
taken into account. 
 
For a calculation of net replacement rate in a stylised study, the following elements are taken 
into account: 
 
Gross wage or gross benefit 
- income tax 
- employee’s social security contribution 
+ cash child allowance (incl. single parent allowance) 
+ housing allowance 
+ possible topping-up of social assistance 
_________________________________________ 
= Disposable income 
- housing costs 
_________________________________________ 
= Family purse income 
 
In this study, deducting the housing costs further modifies the concept of disposable income. 
The concept of family purse income has been used in the previous studies of this group as 
well. The concept can be interpreted to better reflect the income situation after some 
necessary living costs and that it represents that part of the family budget which can be more  
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easily adapted to changes in disposable income. Thus, it can be regarded as room for ‘free 
choice’ of family consumption, whereas it is assumed that families cannot save in housing 
costs, at least in the short run, even if their income is reduced. The choice of family purse 
income tends to lead to lower net replacement rates than the concept of disposable income 
because the deduction of the same amount of money from the out-of-work income and in-
work income affects the former more than the latter. (This effect is further illustrated in the 
calculations presented in the technical annex.) 
 
Child-care is an element which can greatly affect incentives for employment in families with 
children. However, it is not easy to find a common methodology to define child-care costs 
and, secondly, subsidies to child-care cost vary greatly between countries. Due to these 
reasons and the complexity owing to the inclusion of the duration of benefits in this study, it 
does not allow for child-care costs and subsidies. 
 
The calculations assume that the housing costs are 20% of the 100% APW wage (of the 
primary earner) for the family types with one income earner, i.e. for a single person, a single 
parent with children and a one-earner couple without children. For couples with two income 
earners (and with children), the housing costs are assumed to be 30% of the APW wage. The 
housing cost for the family type is kept constant when income changes. 
 
All calculations are made for the year 2000. In other words, the wage levels refer to those in 




The benefit routes try to capture entitlement for the duration of benefits and have been defined 
hypothetically with the aim of representing possible routes to withdraw from the labour 
market, notably through unemployment, and a route to return to the labour market after 
unemployment. 
 
Four routes have been defined: 
(i) Activation route, in which one becomes unemployed, participates in active labour market 
programmes, and finally re-enters employment; 
(ii) Long-term unemployment and social exclusion route, in which one becomes unemployed, 
continues to stay on benefits as long as it is possible, and becomes long-term unemployed 
when unemployment insurance benefits expire, and ends up on last-resort benefit schemes; 
(iii) Early retirement route, in which one may come both through unemployment or directly 
from employment. The route through unemployment is examined here, but when that is not 
possible the route goes from employment to early retirement; 
(iv)  Sickness and  disability route, in which one may come from employment when this 
benefit is used as a substitution for early retirement or genuinely through a sickness case.  
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The purpose of this chapter is to examine incentives to work. The employed person at 
different income levels experiences unemployment and eventually returns to the labour 
market through either participation in active labour market programmes or directly to work. It 
is assumed that the person does not receive the same wage as before unemployment. In 
calculations of the net replacement rates (NRR) the benefit recipient gets 75% or 90% of the 
former wage upon returning to work. For the purpose of presentation it is assumed that a 
person participates in an activation programme after 12 months in unemployment or earlier if 
the duration of the unemployment benefit terminates sooner. 
The chapter begins by describing the out of work assistance schemes that are available in each 
country. A special focus is given to entitlement to benefit, benefit level, and duration of the 
benefit. A short description of the activation measures in the seven countries is also included. 
These are often very detailed and targeted to special groups but the aim is to focus on similar 
measures in countries. 
 
4.2 Unemployment benefit and activation schemes 
 
General remark. The main schemes for unemployment benefits described in the following are 
often supplemented by other general benefits according to the family situation, rent level or 





Eligibility: Voluntary unemployment insurance scheme. Conditions of eligibility depend on 
education, age and work record. Education has to be relevant and of at least 18 months 
duration. Individuals must be between 18 and 63 years of age when they first become 
members. Finally, individuals must have been members for one year, and in work for 52 
weeks (34 weeks for part time workers) within the last three years. 
 
Benefit level: The benefits are income related at 90% of former income, minus the general 
social contribution of 8% (this contribution is not levied on unemployment benefits). The 
maximum benefit is reached at around 2/3 of the income of OECD’s APW. The minimum 
benefit is 82% of the maximum benefit. 
 
Benefit duration: The benefit period is four years – one year on benefits and then up to three 
years in activation. 
 
Activation measures:  An action plan is agreed between the unemployed and the labour office, 
with the labour office having the final say, considering the local need for different types of 
labour. During activation, the general rule is that the individual receives an income equivalent 
to the unemployment benefits he/she is entitled to. This is, however, not the case in private 
job training, where the wage paid should be the usual one for the type of job. 
Special efforts are being made to get the young unemployed quickly into activation. Without 
qualifying education, they must, after having received unemployment benefits for six months, 
enrol in a 1.5-year educational programme in order to continue to be eligible for benefits.  
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For those who are not insured, persons under age 30 are entitled to an activation offer after 13 
weeks, with those aged 30 plus entitled after 12 months of social assistance. 
For the young (below age 25) unemployed without a qualifying education, activation is in the 
form of an education for 1.5 years. In that period they receive students grants or 50% of 
unemployment benefits. For young single parents supplementary benefits are available. 
 
Alternative system: Since unemployment insurance is voluntary, social assistance is not only 
an exit scheme from unemployment insurance for those whose eligibility to an insurance 
scheme has expired, but also the only scheme available for those with no work history (new 




Eligibility:  Unemployment benefit can be either flat-rate unemployment assistance or an 
earnings-related benefit scheme. Both schemes require a work history. The earnings-related 
insurance scheme is voluntary and requires 10 months membership in an unemployment fund. 
The person must be aged between 17 and 64, seeking full-time employment, and satisfy the 
employment condition. In the case of a wage earner, the employment condition is satisfied, 
when, within the last 24 months, employment of at least 18 hours a week (which is subject to 
compulsory unemployment insurance) has lasted 43 weeks. A flat-rate unemployment scheme 
is available for those who fulfil the employment condition but have not joined an insurance 
scheme. In addition, cash labour market support is available for persons who do not qualify 
for unemployment benefits or who have received unemployment benefit for the maximum 
period or exhausted the period with a training subsidy. 
 
Benefit level: The basic component of the earnings-related unemployment benefit consists of 
a flat amount of €20.5 (FIM 121) per day, and a child increase of €4 (FIM 24) for one child, 
up to €7.6 (FIM 45) for three or more children. The earnings-related component equals 42% 
of the difference between daily earnings and the basic component, up to monthly earnings that 
are 90 times the basic unemployment benefit. Income above that level is compensated by 20% 
and there is no maximum in the scheme.  
 
Benefit duration: Maximum entitlement period of unemployment benefits is 500 days. 
 
Activation measures: In order to promote activation, unemployed individuals may 
alternatively participate in labour market training, which provides participants with the skills 
required for the labour market, and also facilitates the matching of supply and demand. Adult 
labour market training is available to persons over 20 years of age. In order to prevent 
exclusion from the labour market, training is targeted at persons who have been unemployed 
for a long time, are disabled or are older workers. Participants in labour market training 
receive the training allowance, which is the same amount as the amount of unemployment 
benefit.  Labour market training is available to those meeting the employment condition and 
under condition that the maximum period for receiving the daily unemployment allowance 
has not expired. Training is flexible in form and can last from a few days to more than a year. 
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Great Britain 
Eligibility: Where most countries use unemployment insurance and social assistance, Great 
Britain has a single, unified unemployment benefit, Jobseekers Allowance (JSA). This is for 
people who are unemployed or working less than 16 hours a week, are available for, and 
actively looking for work, and have entered into a jobseeker’s agreement which remains in 
force. People who don’t have to sign on for work, for example those who are incapable of 
work, aged 60 or over, or lone parents, can claim income support instead. The jobseeker’s 
agreement consists of a description of the type of work you are looking for, the hours you are 
available, and the action you’re expected to take to look for work and to improve your job 
prospects. 
 
Benefit level: Contribution based JSA is a flat rate allowance and is taxable. Entitlement is 
based on the National Insurance contribution record. The amount received depends on age.  It 
is €50 (£31.45) per week for those aged under18, € 66 (£41.35) for those aged 18 to 24, and 
€84 (£52.20) for those aged 25 or over. 
 
Income based JSA is income related and taxable. The amount received is made up of a 
personal allowance – for yourself (same as contribution based JSA amounts), or for a couple, 
and for each dependent child. There are premiums to help with extra costs of disability, age, 
family and caring responsibilities as well as certain housing costs (e.g. mortgage interest). 
 
Benefit duration: Flat rate JSA is payable for up to six months. Each member of a couple can 
claim separately and each qualifies for JSA based on their own contribution record. Claimants 
to income based JSA must have no income or low income, savings of less than £8,000 and 
your partner (if you have one) must work less than 24 hours a week. It can top up contribution 
based JSA if that amount is less than the amount of income based JSA entitled to. Up to 
October 2000, one member of the couple claims for both of them and for any dependants. 
That person must sign on as available for work and meet all other conditions.  After October 
2000, some couples will have to make a joint claim, where both members must sign on as 
available for work and both meet all other conditions for benefit. 
 
Activation measures: From day one on JSA, you are actively encouraged to find employment, 
as part of the jobseeker’s agreement condition for eligibility. In addition, there are a number 
of New Deals operating, targeting six main groups of people
6, and helping those eligible 
(usually based on length of time on JSA) to move into work.  For example, with the New Deal 
for 18 – 24 year olds, those falling into this age group and claiming JSA continuously for six 
months are required to enter the New Deal Gateway. This is a period of up to four months of 
intensive help to find a job and preparation for a New Deal option. The options are: 
 
Employment option – up to 26 weeks of either subsidised employment or self-employment 
for which you receive an allowance on the same basis as the voluntary sector option. 
Voluntary Sector option – up to 26 weeks work with a voluntary organisation for which you 
receive either a training allowance or a wage from the employer. 
Environmental Task Force option – up to six months work on an environmental project, with 
an allowance or wage as with the Voluntary Sector option. 
Full-time education and Training option – up to one year, leading to better educational 
qualification and including work experience, for which you receive the same amount as you 
were getting in benefit. 
                                                 
6 18-24 year olds, those aged 25 and over, partners of unemployed, disabled people, lone parents, and those aged 
50 plus.  
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A new programme called ONE is set up to provide a one-stop shop for advice on job-seeking 




Eligibility: Unemployment benefit for workers definitively-out-of-work who do not maintain 
any link with the previous work. The benefit is available only to workers individually laid off 
in the private sector or collectively laid off but not eligible for mobility benefits.  It is not 
available to first-time job seekers, to those who quit or to self-employed workers, who are not 
eligible to any kind of benefit. The benefit is paid to dismissed workers meeting 52 weeks 
contribution requirements, provided they have been registered on a placement list for at least 
two years, and are fit and available for work. Workers employed in agriculture and 
construction receive special unemployment benefit with more favourable treatment and 
shorter working requirements. 
 
Mobility benefit is paid to those on mobility lists to deal with collective dismissals in firms 
eligible for Special wage supplementation. Wage supplementation funds are for workers at 
risk of unemployment or for displaced workers who maintain links with their previous work 
and could be considered temporarily-out-of-work. The ordinary fund is designed to finance all 
the temporary lay-offs. There is a special fund when the suspension of activity is permanent 
as a consequence of sector or area specific restructuring of firms.  
 
Benefit level: Unemployment benefit is 30% of last earnings to a maximum amount and 
special unemployment benefit is 80% of the last earning. Starting from January 2001, the 
unemployment benefit has been raised to 40% of the last earnings. 
Mobility benefit is 64% of last gross earnings (80% of the wage supplementation, which is 
80% of last earnings) as mobility benefit is provided to workers who have already received 
the wage supplementation during the first year of unemployment, again subject to a maximum 
amount.   
Ordinary wage supplementation fund pays around 80% of last gross earnings in the first year 
to workers in industry, construction and agriculture, for hours not worked due to temporary 
reduction or suspension of activity.   
 
Benefit duration: Unemployment benefit is paid for up to six months and special benefit is 
paid for three months (six months for those in construction). Since January 2001, the duration 
of unemployment benefit has been increased from six to nine months for the unemployed over 
age 50. Mobility benefit duration depends on the age of worker and the location of the firm. 
Ordinary wage supplementation is paid for three months to a maximum of 12 months over a 
three-year period for workers in small firms in specific areas. Special wage supplementation 
is paid for 12-24 months to a maximum of 48 months in special cases. 
 
Activation measures: The main policy interventions are for youth employment and essentially 
consist of monetary incentives, including tax incentives to small and middle sized firms 
located in depressed areas for new hirings. Tax relief, credit facilities and technical assistance 
exist for the young unemployed willing to become self-employed. There is tax relief on all 
employers’ social security contributions for new hirings in depressed regions, for long-term 
unemployed, new part-time hirings from the mobility lists, and for hiring people for socially 
useful jobs. 
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Active labour market policies include apprenticeships with social security reduction for those 
up to age 26. There are subsidies to work in socially useful jobs for long term unemployed on 
the mobility lists. There are subsidies and reduced social security contributions for the job 
training of young individuals on employment lists for at least 30 months. 
 
In 2000 the part-time law has been reformed. The final objective of the reform is to increase 
the share of part-time contracts in Italy, to implement their wider use in the public sector and 
to reduce the rigidity of their utilisation without damaging the worker's conditions. The law 
promotes part-time work through the simplification of administrative and procedural 
mechanisms, the introduction of flexible clauses and higher financial incentives. 
 
The calculations of net replacement rates for the activation routes, presented below, are based 
on a part-time index, which has been assessed considering the case of the unemployed who 
get a part-time job (50% of APW gross wage). Notice that part-time workers cannot obtain 
supplementary unemployment benefits and that the different family types analysed in the 
activation path never end up below the social assistance level which might allow them to 




Eligibility: Insurance based unemployment benefit, which is compulsory for all employees 
except civil servants, who have their own scheme. For entitlement to Unemployment 
Insurance, individuals must register with the Employment Office, accept any suitable work 
offered, arrange and attend job interviews, and have been employed for at least 26 weeks out 
of the 39 weeks preceding unemployment. If, in addition to the above conditions, a person has 
been employed for 52 days or more for at least four out of the last five calendar years, there is 
a salary-related benefit. 
There is a follow-up benefit for a period of up to two years, for persons still unemployed after 
the salary related benefit has expired. 
There is also a short-term benefit for people who do not meet all the eligibility requirements. 
 
Benefit level: Salary-related benefit is 70% of last salary. The benefit has a ceiling of €144.78 
per day. The follow-up benefit and the short-term benefit is 70% of the minimum wage for 
singles. For single providers and couples the benefit is 90% and 100% of minimum wage, 
respectively. 
 
Benefit duration: The salary-related benefit is paid for a period of 6 to 60 months depending 
on employment record. Short-term benefit is paid for six months. 
 
Activation measures:  Positions on secondment where the local authorities sign a contract 
with the long-term unemployed and young unemployed and then send them to employers in 
the public or private sector. This can be combined with training and financial incentives to 
find regular work as soon as possible. The wage received is the legal minimum wage during 
the first period of two years. This can increase to 120% of the minimum wage when the 
contract is changed into an open-ended contract. 
 
Positions for work experience. Local authorities can on a temporary basis (up to one year) 
subsidise part of the labour costs of an employer. In contrast to a position on secondment, 
employees don’t have a contract with the local authorities, but with the employer for whom 
they are working.  The wage received is negotiated with the employer, without limitations.   
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Other instruments for all benefit receivers – training, financial incentives, realisation of places 
in childcare etc. 
 
Spain 
Eligibility: Contributory scheme providing a substitute for the old wage income, which can be 
definitive (when the labour relationship ends), temporary (when the labour relationship is 
suspended) or partial (when the number of hours worked falls). Workers must have been 
employed for a minimum of 360 days in the previous six years. There is also a non-
contributory scheme, which guarantees a minimum income.  
 
Benefit level:  The amount of benefit received is 70% of the contribution base for 180 days 
and then 60% of the base. The benefit is between the official minimum wage and 1.7 times 
that wage for an individual with no dependent children. The floor and ceiling increase with 
the number of children. 
 
Benefit duration: The contributory scheme will entitle employees for 120 days of benefit 
receipt. Workers employed for the whole of the previous six years would be entitled to benefit 
for up to two years. 
 
Activation measures: Benefit for active reintegration into the labour market for the long-term 
unemployed over age 45, with family responsibilities, who have exhausted the contributory 
benefit or assistance benefit.  Participants must commit to an activity program designed by the 
employment services, participate in employment programs or professional retraining and 
accept suitable employment that is offered, provided it be in the usual profession, with a 
reasonable wage, and the individual need not change residence. 
 
In return, the individual receives an individual employment tutor, who performs a number of 




Eligibility:  Voluntary income-related insurance covering members associated to 
Unemployment Insurance Societies and working at least 17 hours per week. The insurance is 
also open for self-employed. Claimants must have been members of an insurance scheme for 
12 months. There are also a number of contributory criteria to be met. Individuals must be 
registered with the Employment Service and be actively looking for work. Any suitable 
employment or training must be accepted. The right to benefit can be renewed by work, by 
taking a job offer or by job training. There is also a basic minimum guarantee system for non-
members, those that do not fulfil the membership time requirement for the income related 
insurance, or those who have just finished full time studies. 
 
Benefit level: The insured receive 80 per cent of the previous income, with a floor of €28.4 
(SEK240) and a ceiling of €68.7 (SEK580) per day. Basic minimum guarantee system is a flat 
rate of €28.4 (SEK240). 
 
Benefit period: The insured receive insurance for 260 days a year. The insurance is paid for 
300 not necessarily consecutive working days (60 weeks) or 450 days for those aged 57 or 
over. The flat rate is paid for 180 days. The benefit is paid for 5 days a week. There is also a 
possibility to renew the insurance by participating in active labour market policies or claiming 
a job offer.  
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Activation measures: The purpose of labour market training is to increase the employability of 
job seekers to avoid long-term unemployment. The purpose is also to facilitate the matching 
of demand and supply by improving the skills of the unemployed. There are a variety of 
programs like Employment training, Work experience, Employment subsidies, Wage 
subsidies, Youth guarantee for age 20-24 or Activity guarantee. The programs are targeted at 
different groups and have shifted over time. The primary aim is to find a suitable job for the 
unemployed. The secondary aim has been to qualify the unemployed for a second period of 
Unemployment Insurance, but with the improvement in the labour market the policy goals are 
higher. Programs are open for unemployed persons or persons who run the risk of being 
unemployed. Some programs are for persons who have been unemployed a long time. The 
programs are available for persons from the age of 20. For younger people there are municipal 
programs. The benefit is the same as in Unemployment Insurance. Those who are not 
qualified for UI will receive a lower training grant of  €16.9 (SEK143) per day. The time of 
the training period is flexible and can last for a short period to more than a year. The aim is to 
find a job by vocational training if the participant lacks professional skills or give 




4.3 Replacement rates 
 
Net replacement rates based on the family purse income concept are presented below, for 
various family characteristics, for in work or out-of-work at various percentages of the seven 
countries relevant APW wage level. In the following graphs two income levels for 
unemployed persons are shown, in activation measures or after return to work, at an hourly 
wage that is 75 per cent of the original wage. The complete table of data is presented in the 
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Net replacement rates from unemployment are below 80 per cent in all countries at the low- 
income level except in the Netherlands, where it is 82 per cent. If 80 per cent is the ‘border 
line’ for incentive problems there seem to be no serious problems in this case. Participation in  
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active labour market measures results in the same replacement rates for unemployment in 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden. Spain has no general activation programme, and that is why 
the replacement rates in activation have not been recorded, whereas in Great Britain, the 
Jobseekers Allowance is a joint benefit, requiring participation in activation at an early stage 
of unemployment. This allowance is presented as an activation scheme in the above graph. In 
Italy, with a very low compensation for unemployment, and in the Netherlands, the 
compensation in activation is higher than in unemployment. In most countries there is no 
financial incentive to join activation from unemployment, participation relies on mandatory 
rules to do so. 
 
Re-entry into work from unemployment or activation at a wage level corresponding to 75 per 
cent of the former income at the low-wage level implies a financial loss in Denmark and 
Sweden. In the remaining countries there is a gain, however, in Italy only when the re-entry is 
from unemployment, and no change in the Netherlands when the re-entry is from activation. 
At the average income level, unemployment replacement rates are equal to those from 
activation except in Italy and all rates are 60 per cent or lower. Re-entry into work at 75 per 
cent of the former average wage level implies a financial gain in all countries. However, this 
gain is only around 10 percentage points compared with the net income when unemployed or 
in activation in Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands, and also in Italy in case of activation. At 
the average wage level, only Italy provides a financial incentive to join activation from 
unemployment. 
 
In the appendix it is shown that returning to work at 90 per cent of the original wage level has 
net replacement rates 2- 16 per cent lower than the original income at the low-income level. In 
countries where a mix of work and unemployment is possible, net replacement rates are 20-30 
per cent lower than fulltime work. 
 
Graph 4.1A Activation route. Net replacement rates for a single person aged 22 




















Young persons in Denmark, who are unemployed and do not have a qualifying education, are 
(usually) not entitled to unemployment benefits after the first six months, but have an 
obligation to enrol in education, during which they receive reduced benefits. In Great Britain, 
there is a lower unemployment/ activation compensation for young persons and this is to 
some extent also the case in the Netherlands. In the other four countries the net replacement 
rates are the same for a 22 year old and a 50 year old, under the assumption that both have 
been out of the labour market.  
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Graph 4.2 Activation route. Net replacement rates for a single parent aged 22 with one 
child 
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Net replacement rates for the young single parent at the low-income level are in most cases 80 
per cent or more in unemployment and activation in Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the 
Netherlands. In Great Britain, Italy and Spain, they are substantially lower. In the ‘High 
Replacement Rate’ countries, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden, there are small 
or even slightly negative incentives to return to work at 75 per cent of the former wage level. 
In Great Britain, incentives to return to work are in place both financially and as requirements 
to participate in activation. 
 
For a single parent at the average income level, the picture is somewhat changed compared to 
that at the low-wage level: Net replacement ratios are lower and return to work is somewhat 
more rewarding. The young Danish single parent in activation has a higher compensation due 
to the provider status than the single person, but it is still lower than in unemployment. 
 
Graph 4.3 Activation route. Net replacement rates for a single parent aged 40 with two 
children 
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The case of an older single parent with two children shows a similar situation to the young 
single parent with one child, though work incentive problems are slightly higher. At the low-
income level, unemployment and activation replacement rates are close to 90 per cent in 
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden. This reflects the fact that benefit systems are  
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more generous as family size increases and in some countries also for older single parents 




This family type, which was once the norm, is becoming less and less common. Nonetheless, 
one-earner couples do remain, and it is interesting to see how replacement rates change when 
the family size is increased to include a dependent spouse.  
 
Graph 4.4 Activation route. Net replacement rates for a one-earner couple aged 50 with 
no children 
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Replacement rates are close to 100 per cent for unemployment and activation at a low-wage 
level in Finland and the Netherlands but below 80 per cent in other countries. As in the former 
cases, there are no financial incentives to participate in activation instead of unemployment, 
except in Italy. At this low-income level, re-entry to work at 75 per cent of the former wage 
level has a negative impact on disposable income in Denmark, Finland the Netherlands and 
Sweden. 
 
Finland experiences severe incentives problems in relation to moving to work from 
unemployment and activation at the average income level as well. In the other countries, re-
entry at 75% of the former wage results in some increase in disposable income compared to 





The two-earner couple is a fairly typical family type in Europe. The following graphs show 
replacement ratios for this family type depending on who follows the route from employment 
via unemployment to activation and re-entry at a lower wage level. In all calculations, it is 
assumed that the primary earner works full-time and the secondary earner part-time, at the 
same hourly wage but earning 50 per cent of the primary earner's income.  
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Graph 4.5 Activation route. Net replacement rates for a two-earner couple aged 40 with 
two children. Primary earner follows the route 
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At the low-income level, the replacement rates are above 90 per cent in Denmark and Sweden 
from unemployment and activation and a return to work at 75 per cent of the former wage 
level does not pay. Finland, the Netherlands and Great Britain (unemployment only) also have 
high replacement rates, close to 80 per cent.  
 
At average income levels, in all countries, the replacement rates are below 80 per cent and 
there is at least a small increase in disposable income if one returns to work at 75% of the 
former wage. 
 
Graph 4.6 Activation route. Net replacement rates for a two-earner couple aged 40 with 
two children. Secondary earner follows the route 
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In the case where the primary income earner keeps the income from full-time work and the 
secondary earner becomes unemployed from a part-time job and tries to return to work, the 
replacement rates are high across all income levels in all countries. They range from 74 per 
cent in Italy to 99 per cent in Denmark at a low-wage level and are close to 90 per cent at the 
average wage level in Denmark and Sweden. In other words, the cost of losing a part-time job 
in a two-earner family is not high if unemployment benefit is available. On the other hand, a 
return to a part-time time job from unemployment would not produce much increase in 
disposable income. 
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Graph 4.7 Activation route. Net replacement rates for a two-earner couple aged 40 with 
two children. Both earners follow the route 
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When both spouses follow the activation route, Denmark and Sweden have replacement rates 
above 80 per cent and disincentives for re-entry into work at 75 per cent of the former wage at 
the low-income level. In the other countries, the re-entry to work at 75% of the former low-
wage level results in some increase in disposable income compared to unemployment or 
activation. 
 
At the average income level, all replacement rates are below 80 per cent and re-entry into 
work at a lower than usual wage pays off although the margin is close in Denmark and 
Sweden. 
 
4.4 Main findings 
 
In Denmark, Finland and Sweden, there are no additional financial incentives for participation 
in activation programmes: the net replacement rates are the same as on unemployment 
benefits. Italy and the Netherlands provide higher benefits when the unemployed persons 
participate in activation programmes and so these countries also provide additional financial 
incentives for activation. However, in the Netherlands, this incentive is only provided to low-
wage earners in two-earner families. In Great Britain, there is only one joint benefit, which 
can be considered as an activation benefit rather than just an unemployment benefit, due to its 
strict requirement of participation in activation. Spain provides no general activation 
programme.  
 
The Netherlands, Great Britain and Denmark provide stronger incentives for young persons to 
participate in activation programmes and to seek a job through reduced benefits and tighter 
eligibility rules just for unemployment benefits. In addition, Denmark, while combining 
duties and rights, requires that young unemployed persons who do not have an educational 
qualification must enrol in an education program in order to be eligible for continued, 
although reduced, benefits. In the case where they choose a labour market training 
programme, the benefit is low. Hence, this encourages young people to choose ordinary 
education instead of an activation programme.  
 
Replacement rates are higher for low-wage earners than average earners both in activation and 
in unemployment in all countries. This reflects the aim of providing a decent income level 
when out of work, irrespective of the former wage level. It is the result of several factors in 
the tax-benefit schemes, such as minimum levels of benefits, means-tested benefits and  
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progressive income taxation. On the other hand, it reduces the net gain from moving back to 
work from unemployment, in other words, the incentives to work are weak. 
 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden tend to have higher replacement rates, and hence 
lower incentives to enter work than the other countries, across all family types. Italy and 
Spain tend to have the lowest replacement rates, while Great Britain and Finland fall 
somewhere in the middle. In particular, incentives to return to work at a lower wage level than 
one had before unemployment are weak for a low-wage earner. When this is combined with 
the observation that most countries provide no financial incentives to participate in activation 
programmes, the question of duration of unemployment benefits and of requirements for 
participating in activation programmes become very important. 
 
4.5 Appendix for chapter 4 
 
Net replacement rates based on the family purse income are presented in the following tables 
for all income levels in the activation route. Extracts of the data are presented and analysed in 
the graphs in the chapter. Re-entry to full time work at both 75 per cent and 90 per cent of the 
previous wage level are also presented in the tables. In four countries it is possible to be 
unemployed half of the time and work the other half. Data on re-entry at 75 per cent and 90 
per cent of the previous wage are also presented for these countries. 
 
The income of the primary earner is shown in the head of the table for two-earner couples. 
The wage level of the secondary earner is half of that level.  
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Table 4.1 Single aged 50 in activation route 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
UNEMPLOYMENT      
Denmark 74  57 46 36  30
Finland 55  50 44 37  34
Great Britain  49  38 29 22  18
Italy 31  31 33 33  33
The Netherlands  82  64 60 62  66
Spain 53  60 63 51  41
Sweden 68  71 55 42  35
ACTIVATION       
Denmark 74  57 46 36  30
Finland 55  50 44 37  34
Great Britain  49  38 29 22  18
Italy 72  66 60 45  47
The Netherlands  100  80 60 45  38
Spain -  - - -  -
Sweden 68  71 55 42  35
WORK RE-ENTRY 75% WAGE     
Denmark 59  65 73 76  75
Finland 72  68 71 73  75
Great Britain  74  66 69 70  71
Italy 66  68 73 73  73
The Netherlands  100  80 69 70  74
Spain 66  72 73 73  74
Sweden 61  64 67 71  75
WORK RE-ENTRY 90% WAGE     
Denmark 84  86 92 90  90
Finland 87  87 89 89  90
Great Britain  85  87 87 88  88
Italy 86  87 89 89  89
The Netherlands  98  87 87 89  90
Spain 88  89 89 89  90
Sweden 84  86 86 90  90
WORK 50% AT 75% WAGE/ UNEMPLOYED 50%    
Denmark 74  61 60 57  56
Finland 73  66 65 61  58
Spain 71  75 81 81  78
Sweden 66  68 70 74  78
WORK 50% AT 90% WAGE/ UNEMPLOYED 50%    
Denmark 79  72 70 67  64
Finland 76  72 71 65  62
Spain 75  80 82 78  73
Sweden 78  78 80 84  85
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Table 4.2 Single parent aged 22 with one child in activation route 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
UNEMPLOYMENT      
Denmark 89  79 69 57  49
Finland 83  82 70 58  52
Great Britain  50  46 41 33  27
Italy 50  50 53 51  50
The Netherlands  83  77 65 50  42
Spain 55  54 61 61  50
Sweden 87  86 74 60  51
ACTIVATION    
Denmark 73  65 57 47  40
Finland 83  82 70 58  52
Great Britain  50  46 41 33  27
Italy 69  69 71 55  55
The Netherlands  90  83 70 54  46
Spain -  - - -  -
Sweden 87  86 74 60  51
WORK RE-ENTRY 75% WAGE     
Denmark 80  83 83 80  79
Finland 88  89 78 75  75
Great Britain  90  89 87 77  73
Italy 75  78 81 74  75
The Netherlands  90  87 81 72  75
Spain 66  67 73 74  74
Sweden 83  83 81 76  78
WORK RE-ENTRY 90% WAGE     
Denmark 93  93 94 92  91
Finland 96  96 90 90  90
Great Britain  96  95 95 89  89
Italy 92  92 93 90  89
The Netherlands  94  95 89 89  91
Spain 85  87 90 90  90
Sweden 94  93 91 92  91
WORK 50% AT 75% WAGE/ UNEMPLOYED 50%    
Denmark 85  81 77 69  64
Finland 94  94 82 70  66
Spain 87  79 76 82  83
Sweden 86  85 82 78  81
WORK 50% AT 90% WAGE/ UNEMPLOYED 50%    
Denmark 91  87 82 74  70
Finland 97  96 83 73  69
Spain 78  76 81 83  78
Sweden 91  90 88 86  87
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Table 4.3 Single parent aged 40 with two children in activation route 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
UNEMPLOYMENT      
Denmark 89  82 72 63  55
Finland 87  85 83 71  64
Great Britain  65  60 55 46  38
Italy 53  51 54 52  50
The Netherlands  84  76 71 62  64
Spain 59  61 59 65  58
Sweden 90  89 79 67  59
ACTIVATION    
Denmark 89  82 72 63  55
Finland 87  85 83 71  64
Great Britain  65  60 55 46  38
Italy 72  69 74 60  59
The Netherlands  90  84 72 57  48
Spain -  - - -  -
Sweden 90  89 79 67  59
WORK RE-ENTRY 75% WAGE     
Denmark 82  86 85 84  81
Finland 91  91 91 80  80
Great Britain  94  90 88 82  73
Italy 78  78 84 79  77
The Netherlands  90  88 83 74  76
Spain 72  67 71 75  75
Sweden 87  86 85 82  81
WORK RE-ENTRY 90% WAGE     
Denmark 94  95 94 93  93
Finland 97  97 96 92  92
Great Britain  96  96 95 89  89
Italy 93  90 93 92  90
The Netherlands  95  96 90 89  91
Spain 86  86 89 90  90
Sweden 95  95 94 93  92
WORK 50% AT 75% WAGE/ UNEMPLOYED 50%    
Denmark 71  84 80 75  70
Finland 95  94 94 80  80
Spain 85  84 76 80  83
Sweden 89  88 86 83  83
WORK 50% AT 90% WAGE/ UNEMPLOYED 50%    
Denmark 77  89 84 80  75
Finland 97  96 77 81  75
Spain 84  77 79 83  83
Sweden 93  92 91 88  88
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Table 4.4 One-earner couple in activation route 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
UNEMPLOYMENT      
Denmark 78  62 50 39  34
Finland 96  95 95 78  65
Great Britain  73  62 46 35  28
Italy 45  44 45 42  41
The Netherlands  99  92 74 67  70
Spain 50  55 61 50  41
Sweden 68  71 55 42  35
ACTIVATION       
Denmark 78  62 50 39  34
Finland 96  95 95 78  65
Great Britain  73  62 46 35  28
Italy 68  66 67 50  51
The Netherlands  99  92 78 63  52
Spain 3  2 2 1  1
Sweden 68  71 55 42  35
WORK RE-ENTRY 75% WAGE     
Denmark 66  68 74 76  77
Finland 88  82 71 73  75
Great Britain  89  80 68 70  71
Italy 73  72 76 74  74
The Netherlands  98  87 81 75  78
Spain 63  67 73 74  74
Sweden 61  64 67 71  75
WORK RE-ENTRY 90% WAGE     
Denmark 86  87 92 90  91
Finland 95  90 89 89  91
Great Britain  95  87 87 88  88
Italy 90  88 90 89  89
The Netherlands  94  95 89 93  92
Spain 85  87 90 90  90
Sweden 84  86 86 90  90
WORK 50% AT 75% WAGE/ UNEMPLOYED 50%    
Denmark 72  65 62 59  58
Finland 102  68 76 67  58
Spain 71  74 76 82  80
Sweden 66  68 70 74  78
WORK 50% AT 90% WAGE/ UNEMPLOYED 50%    
Denmark 82  74 71 68  66
Finland 65  69 77 69  62
Spain 74  76 81 80  74
Sweden 78  78 80 84  85
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Table 4.5 Two-earner couple in activation route. Primary earner follows route 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
UNEMPLOYMENT      
Denmark 96  90 72 63  58
Finland 74  71 62 57  57
Great Britain  84  72 56 39  34
Italy 57  57 56 54  54
The Netherlands  74  76 77 78  80
Spain 67  73 76 77  72
Sweden 90  90 78 67  62
ACTIVATION    
Denmark 96  90 72 63  58
Finland 74  71 62 57  57
Great Britain  84  72 56 39  34
Italy 72  76 69 67  68
The Netherlands  89  79 70 62  58
Spain -  - - -  -
Sweden 90  90 78 67  62
WORK RE-ENTRY 75% WAGE   
Denmark 85  85 83 84  86
Finland 94  90 84 85  85
Great Britain  93  85 82 82  82
Italy 86  83 83 83  84
The Netherlands  85  82 82 83  84
Spain 75  81 83 83  83
Sweden 87  87 83 83  85
WORK RE-ENTRY 90% WAGE   
Denmark 94  94 92 94  94
Finland 98  93 94 94  94
Great Britain  97  92 93 93  93
Italy 97  92 93 93  94
The Netherlands  92  93 93 94  94
Spain 90  93 93 93  93
Sweden 95  95 92 94  94
WORK 50% AT 75% WAGE/ UNEMPLOYED 50%    
Denmark 99  90 77 73  72
Finland 73  66 65 61  58
Spain 91  86 89 88  90
Sweden 89  88 84 85  87
WORK 50% AT 90% WAGE/ UNEMPLOYED 50%    
Denmark 99  90 81 78  78
Finland 76  72 71 65  62
Spain 84  87 89 89  89
Sweden 93  92 88 91  91
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Table 4.6 Two-earner couple in activation route. Secondary earner follows route 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
UNEMPLOYMENT      
Denmark 99  97 90 85  81
Finland 80  77 77 78  78
Great Britain  85  74 60 57  57
Italy 74  73 72 71  72
The Netherlands  86  86 86 88  88
Spain 84  87 86 85  83
Sweden 94  93 91 92  92
ACTIVATION    
Denmark 99  97 90 85  81
Finland 80  77 77 75  78
Great Britain  85  74 60 57  57
Italy 81  81 83 83  82
The Netherlands  81  81 81 83  84
Spain -  - - -  -
Sweden 94  93 91 92  22
WORK RE-ENTRY 75% WAGE   
Denmark 93  93 91 91  90
Finland 95  89 90 91  91
Great Britain  93  85 82 82  82
Italy 93  90 91 90  91
The Netherlands  89  89 89 91  91
Spain 88  90 71 89  90
Sweden 92  92 89 90  91
WORK RE-ENTRY 90% WAGE   
Denmark 97  97 96 96  96
Finland 98  96 96 97  97
Great Britain  97  92 93 93  93
Italy 96  96 96 96  96
The Netherlands  95  96 96 97  96
Spain 95  96 88 96  97
Sweden 97  97 96 96  96
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Table 4.7 Two-earner couple in activation route. Both earners follows route 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
UNEMPLOYMENT      
Denmark 93  87 71 57  48
Finland 69  67 58 49  43
Great Britain  79  67 52 41  34
Italy 46  46 47 30  31
The Netherlands  60  62 64 66  68
Spain 50  56 62 62  56
Sweden 84  83 72 62  55
ACTIVATION    
Denmark 93  87 71 57  48
Finland 69  67 58 49  43
Great Britain  79  67 52 41  34
Italy 74  55 56 54  51
The Netherlands  69  60 51 45  42
Spain -  - - -  -
Sweden 84  83 72 62  55
WORK RE-ENTRY 75% WAGE   
Denmark 78  78 75 75  76
Finland 88  84 74 76  77
Great Britain  93  85 82 82  82
Italy 79  77 77 74  74
The Netherlands  79  71 72 73  76
Spain 63  68 71 72  74
Sweden 80  79 75 73  76
WORK RE-ENTRY 90% WAGE   
Denmark 91  91 89 91  90
Finland 96  91 90 90  91
Great Britain  97  92 93 93  93
Italy 93  91 90 89  90
The Netherlands  88  88 89 90  90
Spain 85  89 88 89  90
Sweden 92  92 88 91  90
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In this study we consider social exclusion resulting from following a route from employment 
to unemployment which continues for a long time. On this route, after a period of time the 
eligibility to unemployment benefit expires and the living of an individual becomes dependent 
upon basic assistance. In this chapter, we analyse benefit availability and benefit levels during 
such a route. We consider the concept of social exclusion as exclusion from the labour 
market, which in the long run leads to a dependency on last-resort social benefits and thus 
exposes the person concerned to social exclusion
7. Exclusion may occur for many reasons and 
in many patterns. An obvious reason is that a long spell out of the labour market deteriorates 
the skill level, which in turn increases employability problems and makes the return to the 
labour market more difficult. In addition, as work also provides meaningful social networks, 
long periods out of work erode these networks and the individual’s social life. Thus, exclusion 
from the labour market is not only an economic matter but also a matter of people’s behaviour 
and living conditions in general. However, in this study our main interest is the change in a 
person’s economic situation. 
 
Benefits available during such a route are usually unemployment benefit and last-resort 
(basic) social assistance. A summary of this route describing the availability of different 
benefits and their duration is provided in table 5.1. Unemployment benefit has already been 
described in chapter 4. In this chapter, last-resort assistance schemes and their relation to 
unemployment benefit and income from work are examined closer. 
 
In most countries, the basic assistance is social assistance. In addition, Finland and Spain 
provide other forms of assistance, especially in case of prolonged unemployment. In Finland, 
individuals whose eligibility for unemployment benefit expires are entitled to cash labour 
market support. In Spain individuals are entitled to unemployment assistance. These benefits 
are provided alongside social assistance but may involve, for instance, more simple 
administration and less frequent control for renewal of the entitlement. In addition, in Finland, 
receipt of labour market support does not exclude the receipt of social assistance if the level 
of the latter becomes higher than that of labour market support. This is because the social 
assistance is the genuine last-resort assistance in the sense that it constitutes the guaranteed 
minimum income level. 
 
5.2 Main schemes 
 
The social exclusion route is usually composed of two parts. In the first part, in every country 
in this study, individuals who meet certain working conditions are entitled to unemployment 
insurance benefit. Not only the level of the benefit varies but also the schemes are different in 
duration. The length varies from four months to five years. When the eligibility for 
unemployment benefit expires, the exit scheme is social assistance in most cases. In Finland 
the exit scheme is labour market support and in Spain it is unemployment assistance. 
 
 
                                                 
7 In social policy literature, social exclusion is often defined by stricter multidimensional characteristics, such as 
“inability of an individual to participate in the basic political, economic and social functions of the society where 
he or she lives”. This implies that social exclusion covers, in addition to a poor access to the labour market, 
things such as poor housing conditions and poor access to health or other public services etc.  
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Denmark 
Danish social assistance is not a guaranteed minimum income scheme. There is, generally 
speaking, no automatic topping-up to the level of social assistance if the income from other 
sources is low. In this respect, the Danish social assistance differs from the schemes of many 
other countries. 
 
Eligibility: Eligibility for social assistance requires a social event, e.g. unemployment, illness 
or divorce and no alternative means to support the living of the individual and the family. 
This means that the recipient has no other income nor any net wealth (above a minimum 
threshold) when social assistance starts to be received. If the situation of the recipient 
changes, e.g. by an earnings income, the social assistance benefit will be tapered. A couple 
may receive social assistance for both spouses, even if only one of them has experienced a 
social event. 
 
Benefit level: The individual benefit for a person over 25 years is: 




Not provider (60% of maximum unemployment benefit)  995€   7 410 DKK 
Provider of children (80% of maximum unemployment benefit) 1 324€   9 865 DKK 
Young person (age<25) living independently  1 001€   4 753 DKK 
Young person (age<25) living with parents  312€   2 324 DKK 
 
Both spouses meeting the eligibility criteria will receive the individual amount of social 
assistance. If one of the spouses has never worked and has no intention to do so, that spouse 
will not receive any social assistance, but the husband will receive a supplement of 2,324 
DKK a month (the same rate as for young people living with their parents). Special rules of 
tapering the benefit are applied, for instance, if one of the spouses receives earnings or 
another benefit such as pension or unemployment benefit. 
 
Benefit duration: Benefit duration is unlimited. 
 
Labour market requirements: Persons receiving social assistance are obliged to participate in 
activation programmes: those under age 30 when they have received social assistance for 
three months and those over age 30 when assistance has been received for 12 months. 
 
Supplementary benefits available: Along with social assistance persons are entitled to receive 
ordinary child benefits and a means-tested housing allowance. Eligibility for the means-tested 
housing allowance also requires a social event like the personal social assistance. The housing 




Eligibility: The cash labour market support is an income guarantee benefit payable to 
unemployed persons after they have received unemployment benefit for the maximum period 
of 500 days. It is also paid in cases where an unemployed person does not satisfy the 
employment condition (i.e. too short or no work history) required to qualify for the 
unemployment allowance and where the person is looking for a job or undergoing labour 
market policy measures. It is intended to promote the unemployed person’s access or return to 
the labour market. 
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Benefit level: Except for the child increase, the rates of the labour market support are equal to 
those of the basic unemployment benefit. The only difference is that labour market support is 
means-tested against all personal income of the unemployed person and the spouse’s income 
above a certain limit. 
 
  Rate per day Rate per month  
Labour market support, full rate  20.5 € (121 FIM) 431€  
Child increase, 1 child  1.6 € (9.60 FIM) 34€ 
2 children  2.4 € (14 FIM) 49 € 
2+ children  3 € (18.40 FIM) 65 € 
 
Benefit duration: Benefit duration is unlimited. 
 
Supplementary benefits available: Persons receiving labour market support are entitled to 
have child allowance, means-tested housing allowance and means-tested social assistance. 
The latter is valid especially for families with children because the rates for children are 




In this chapter it is assumed that the unemployed receives Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) during 
the unemployment spell. For the first six months the JSA is contribution based and after that 
period the JSA is means-tested against the income and wealth of the family. For a description 




Social assistance is not only an exit scheme from unemployment insurance; it is also an 
alternative to that scheme. This also implies that social assistance recipients are available for 
the labour market and participate in active labour market measures. The complete social 
assistance scheme can be considered adopting the distinction between work related benefits 
and non-work related benefits. Focusing on the social assistance scheme used in the 
calculations, that is minimum income support, administered at local level and currently under 
trial in a few Italian municipalities, we made the assumption that this benefit has been 
extended to all regions. 
 
Eligibility: The target groups of minimum income support are all people/households in need 
or identified as at significant risk of social exclusion. The program raises the household’s 
income to a threshold slightly below the poverty line, but tests for the absence of any asset 
beside the residential house. There is also the residence criterion that the person’s stay in the 
country should be at least 12 months for EU citizens, and for at least three years for non-EU 
citizens. For people with working capacity the benefit is conditional on either availability to 
accept a labour offer, active labour search, participation to training programs, or care activity 
towards children or disabled people within the family. The beneficiaries must be registered at 
the public employment service. 
 
Benefit level: The ceiling of the minimum income support is €269 (520,000 lire) per month 
and this amount represents the maximum benefit for a single person with no other income 
source. This threshold increases directly with the economic condition indicator; the number of 
family members and social-demographic condition, and is modified according to an  
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appropriate equivalence scale. For instance, the ceiling for a household with five members is 
€765 (1,482,000 lire) per month, which is also the amount of benefit for a five–member 
household with no other income sources. By contrast, assuming that a five-member household 
has other income sources, the benefit is equal to the difference between the ceiling and the 
total household income assessed by the economic condition indicator. Among the elements of 
the total household income, which are relevant for the economic condition indicator there are 
all other benefits addressed to the family. An earnings disregard of 25 per cent is applied to 
labour income when the economic condition indicator is calculated, aimed at promoting 
income from work. Both the minimum income support and the corresponding threshold are 
indexed each year to the consumer price index. 
 




The National Assistance Act provides a minimum income to meet essential living costs. 
 
Eligibility: Any Dutch national - or foreigners living in the Netherlands legally- without 
sufficient means to provide for essential needs is granted Social Assistance. It is granted 
complementary to all other subsistence allowances and is provided as a last resort. 
 
Benefit level: National norms have been established in the National Assistance Act for 
persons aged from 21 to 64 and for persons aged 65 and older. 
Each group falls under a different norm: 
 
  Share of the net minimum wage, % 
Married couples and cohabitants
8 100 
Lone parents   70 
Single persons   50 
 
The starting point for the standard amount for lone parents and single persons is that 
(housing) expenses are shared with other people. If this is not, or only partly, the case the 
municipal authorities may pay a supplementary allowance of no more than 20% of the net 
minimum wage. Lone parents or single persons living on their own, and consequently unable 
to share their essential living costs with other persons, are also entitled to this maximum 
allowance. 
 
Social Assistance for persons between age 21 and age 64, net monthly amounts (rounded) 
  Basic Norm Holiday allowance
Married couples and cohabitants   €924 (ƒ 2 056) €52 (ƒ 115)
Lone parents  €653 (ƒ 1 439) €37 (ƒ 81)
Single persons   €466 (ƒ 1 028) €26 (ƒ 58)
Maximum allowance for single and single parents  €187 (ƒ 411) €10 (ƒ 23)
 
                                                 
8 This includes all situations in which two people run a joint household, with the exception of immediate 
relatives (parent-child).  
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Spain 
Eligibility: The assistance benefits are a continuation of the contribution system, but they are 
no longer intended to substitute the wage but palliate the lack of economic resources. 
However, only the unemployed that have previously contributed for unemployment benefits 
are entitled (with some exceptions). People looking for their first job are not entitled, nor 
those that have previously been self-employed, domestic service employees or, in most 
regions, agricultural workers. 
 
Benefit level: The level is  75% of the current official minimum wage, not including 
extraordinary pay (€319 (ESP53,010) per month) plus social security contributions paid by 
the INEM, but (except for one case) only for medical assistance and family protection. 
 
Benefit duration: Those who have contributed previously can receive the assistance benefit 
for a limited period if they meet other requirements. Some of these requirements are common 
to all categories and others are specific. The maximum period during which one can receive 
unemployment assistance depends on age, dependants, and, to a lesser extent, on previous 
contribution record. Workers aged over 52 have no duration limit until retirement age. 
Workers with dependants and at least six months of contributions get from 21 to 30 months of 
assistance, on top of the insurance. Young workers without dependants usually get no 




Social assistance is the final income safety net within the welfare program. When more 
general welfare benefits, such as housing allowance, cannot provide acceptable economic 
resources, social assistance offers the last possible solution. A person is entitled to help with 
achieving a reasonable standard of living if there is no other way to earn a living. The help 
can imply a number of different measures, of which financial assistance is one. Social 
assistance serves two different purposes, to secure the upkeep of the individual or family, and 
to have a preventive and rehabilitative function. 
 
Eligibility: Social assistance is an asset (means)-tested minimum guarantee. The assistance 
should ensure the individual’s subsistence and be designed to strengthen the individual. Need 
has to be reduced as much as possible, e.g. by moving to cheaper accommodation and 
applying for housing benefits. The unemployed must be registered with the Employment 
Service and be actively looking for a job. Any offer of suitable employment or training 
received must also be accepted. On the other hand, social assistance cannot be made 
conditional on undergoing some form of care or treatment. The National Board of Health and 
Welfare establish a guideline norm for social assistance, which has an individual and a 
household dimension.  
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Benefit level: The individual norm varies according to age of children and, for pre-school 
children, if lunch is eaten at home or not. There are seven different age groups. There is one 
norm for a single adult person and another norm for cohabitants. The household dimension 
fluctuates according to the numbers of household members. 
 
  Rate per month for 
personal expenses 
Household rate per month based on
the number of family members
Adult single  € 284 (SEK 2 400) 1 person € 71 (SEK 600)
Adult cohabitant  € 516 (SEK 4 360) 2 persons € 81 (SEK 680)
Below age 1  € 145 (SEK 1 220) 3 persons € 92 (SEK 780)
Age 1-2  € 174 (SEK 1 470) 4 persons € 100 (SEK 840)
Age 3  € 137 (SEK 1 160) 5 persons € 111 (SEK 940)
Age 4-6  € 171 (SEK 1 440) 6 persons € 118 (SEK 1000)
Age 7-10  € 188 (SEK 1 590) 7 persons € 126 (SEK 1060)
Age 11-14  € 224 (SEK 1 890)
Age 15-18  € 254 (SEK 2 140)
 
Benefit duration: Benefit duration is unlimited. 
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Table 5.1. Social exclusion routes 
 




Scheme Duration  Additional  benefits  Scheme Additional  benefits  Duration 
Denmark 52weeks 
within the last 
3 years 
Optional insurance  Two periods. Initially 1 
year, second 3 years 
Child benefit, 
housing benefit  
Social assistance  Child benefit, 
housing benefit 
No limit 
Finland 43  weeks 
within the last 
2 years 









Great Britain    Contribution based 
Jobseekers 
Allowance, JSA 
6 months (182 days) in any 
job seeking period 
Child benefit, 
housing benefit, 







Italy 52  weeks 




6 months (180 days)  Child benefit, 
housing benefit, 
social assistance 
Social assistance  Child benefit, 
housing benefit 
No limit 
The Netherlands  26 weeks 
within the last 
39 weeks  
Income related 
benefit 
Depends on employment 
record: 
4 years:  6 months 
 5 to 10 years:  9 months 
10 to 15 years:  1 year 
15 to 20 years:  1½ year 
20 to 25 years:  2 years 
25 to 30 years:  2½ years 
30 to 35 years:  3 years 
35 to 40 years:  4 years 




Social assistance  Child benefit, 
housing benefit 
No limit 
Spain 360  days 




Depends on employment 










age, family and 
contribution 
record 
Sweden 6  months 
within the last 
year 
Optional insurance  14 months (300 days)  Child benefit, 
housing benefit, 
social assistance 
Social assistance  Child benefit, 
housing benefit 
No limit  
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5.3 Replacement rates  
 
There is considerable variation of generosity of the tax-benefit systems across countries and 
the profile of the social exclusion route varies as well. In table 5.1 there is an overview of the 
schemes available on the route and the duration of the different schemes. Comparing net 
replacement rates without considering the duration of the underlying scheme is not enough. In 
graph 5.1 there is an attempt to illustrate both net replacement rates and the time dimension. 
This kind of graph should illustrate all family types and income levels, but since it is difficult 
to make them easily readable we settle with one example. The example is a single person on a 
low income and the kinks have been a little exaggerated for some countries. 
 
Graph 5.1 Long-term unemployment and social exclusion route. Net replacement rate 


















On the route to social exclusion, there are generally two different regimes: unemployment 
benefit and social assistance, the latter of which can continue indefinitely in principle. In three 
countries, namely the Netherlands, Sweden and Italy, the benefit level increases slightly when 
unemployment benefit is exhausted. In other words, social assistance - the last-resort benefit - 
provides a higher level of benefit than unemployment benefit at a low-wage level. In three 
other countries, namely Denmark, Finland and Spain, there is a drop in the benefit level at the 
time of the expiring date of the unemployment benefit. This drop is sharpest in Spain and 
smoothest in Denmark, occurring only after unemployment benefit receipt of four years. For 
Great Britain, there is a constant replacement rate. After six months of contribution-based 
Jobseekers Allowance, the means-tested variant of JSA is received. In the cases described in 
this chapter there is no difference between these benefits. 
  




Graph 5.2 Long-term unemployment and social exclusion route. Net replacement rate 
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For low-wage earners, the replacement rates from the exit schemes, social assistance or 
unemployment assistance, are as high as or higher than those of the unemployment insurance 
scheme in Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden, while at the average wage level 
there is a drop in the benefit level when unemployment benefit expires in all countries except 
in Great Britain. At the average income level all replacement rates are below 65 per cent and 
those from the exit scheme are even lower. 
 
Graph 5.3 Long-term unemployment and social exclusion route. Net replacement rate 
for a single parent aged 40 with two children 
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A lone parent with two children at a low-income level has high replacement rates of over 80 
per cent in unemployment benefit schemes in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and 
Sweden. The rates fall markedly in Spain, Finland and Sweden if the person concerned moves 
into an exit scheme; in other countries the benefit level does not change much at low-wage 
levels. The replacement rates are lower at the average income level and the difference 
between the levels of unemployment and exit schemes is somewhat clearer, except in Great 
Britain.   




Graph 5.4 Long-term unemployment and social exclusion route. Net replacement rate 
for a one-earner couple aged 50 with no children 
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In the above graph two cases are presented for Denmark: in case I the spouse is not available 
for the labour market, and as a consequence eligibility to social assistance and housing 
allowance are reduced, whereas in case II the spouse is available for the labour market and, 
consequently, also eligible to receive full amounts of social assistance and housing allowance. 
For such a couple with one low-wage earner, the net replacement rates of the exit scheme are 
close to or above 100 per cent in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden. In addition, 
the level of the exit benefit is about the same as that of the unemployment benefit in most 
countries; it only drops in Spain, and in Sweden there is an increase. 
 
Replacement rates are substantially lower at the average income level, however, in Finland 
and the Netherlands the rates are in the 80 per cent area. It is typical for this family type that 
the exit scheme often results in a better compensation than the insurance scheme because the 
‘non-active’ spouse often receives social assistance directly or indirectly. Even at the average 
wage level, the exit scheme results in about the same benefit level as the insurance scheme, 
with the exception of Spain.  




Graph 5.5 Long-term unemployment and social exclusion route. Net replacement rate 
for a two-earner couple aged 50 with two children. Primary income earner follows the 
route 
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Low-income households with two earners and children face fairly high net replacement rates 
in every country; between 60 and close to 100 per cent in insurance schemes. In the exit 
scheme, the benefit level is about the same in Denmark, Great Britain and Sweden, and higher 
in Italy. Denmark faces the clearest incentive problems, with net replacement rates of almost 
100 per cent. Great Britain and Sweden also have high rates, above 80 per cent, when the 
primary earner in a household is encountering unemployment or social assistance. 
 
At the average income level, net replacement rates are substantially lower for exit schemes, 
the Netherlands and Spain having the greatest differences between the levels of the insurance 
and exit schemes.  
 
Graph 5.6 Long-term unemployment and social exclusion route. Net replacement rate 
for a two-earner couple aged 50 with two children. Secondary income earner follows the 
route  
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In this case the primary income earner keeps the income from full-time work and the 
secondary earner becomes unemployed from part-time work; the effect on both the insurance 
and the exit scheme compensation is smaller than in the case where the primary earner  
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becomes unemployed. At the low-income level, almost all countries have replacement rates 
from insurance schemes at or above 80 per cent and from exit schemes about as high or 
somewhat lower. The only exception is the Netherlands, where the replacement rate of the 
exit scheme is markedly lower than that of the unemployment benefit scheme. 
 
At the average income level insurance compensation still results in replacement rates around 
80 per cent in Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Finland. All exit scheme rates 
are lower than the insurance scheme rates except in Great Britain. 
 
Graph 5.7 Long-term unemployment and social exclusion route. Net replacement rate 
for a two-earner couple aged 50 with two children. Both income earners follow the route 
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When both spouses follow the route, the net replacement rates in Denmark, Great Britain and 
Sweden are above or close to 80 per cent for both schemes in the low-income case. 
 
At the average income level, most replacement rates are between 60 and 70 per cent in the 
insurance scheme, while the exit schemes result in lower replacement rates in all countries 
except Great Britain. The greatest drops occur in the Netherlands and Spain. 
 
 
5.4 Main findings 
 
The duration of unemployment benefits varies largely across countries, which was 
demonstrated in graph 5.1. In addition, the period during which the insured has paid 
contributions to the scheme affects the duration of the unemployment benefit receipt in the 
Netherlands and Spain. After such a period of varying length, when the eligibility for 
unemployment benefit expires, the unemployed person usually qualifies for social assistance 
or unemployment assistance. Social assistance is the exit scheme in all countries except in 
Finland, Great Britain and Spain. In Finland, the unemployed person is entitled to labour 
market support, which can, however, be topped up by social assistance if the latter provides a 
higher level of income maintenance. This can be the case especially for families with 
children. In Spain, the exit scheme is unemployment assistance, and in Great Britain the 
means-tested Jobseekers Allowance. 
 
Unemployment compensation often leads to incentive problems particularly at the low-
income level. This is sometimes also the case at the average income level. The three Nordic 
countries are steady candidates for these incentive problems, sometimes together with the 
Netherlands and Spain.  
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The insurance scheme is aimed at short to medium terms of unemployment, while the exit 
scheme is provided for a longer term, usually without any time limit. As far as incentives to 
work are concerned, there is a problem if the long-term exit scheme results in higher 
replacement rates than the insurance scheme. This happens in many countries, especially at 
low wage levels, but sometimes also at average wage levels, in particular for the one-earner 
couple. However, this problem may be diminishing since the number of households in this 
‘classic’ family type is being replaced by two-earner couples. On the other hand, this family 
type is relatively common among immigrant families in the Nordic countries. 
 
The net replacement rates from the two schemes examined above are often similar. This is 
always the case for Great Britain, but Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands also share this 
characteristic. In fact, apart from Spain, continuation of unemployment only affects the level 
of net replacement rates a little, especially at low wage levels. An additional incentive 
problem associated with social assistance, is that it does not generally require availability for 
the labour market. In most countries, the level of social assistance is comparable to the level 
of unemployment benefit at 67 per cent of the average wage level.   
 
 
5.5 Appendix to chapter 5 
 
Net replacement rates based on the family purse income concept are presented in the 
following tables. Extracts are used in the graphs together with the duration of long-term 
unemployment preceding social assistance. 
 
 
Table 5.2 Single person aged 50 with social assistance 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
Denmark 60  46 37 29  24
Finland 32  25 20 15  13
Great Britain  49  38 29 22  18
Italy 33  27 21 16  14
The Netherlands  88  70 52 40  33
Spain 13  11 9 7  6
Sweden 73  57 41 32  27
 
Table 5.3 Single parent aged 40 with social assistance. Two children 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
Denmark 82  75 66 58  51
Finland 67  63 59 49  43
Great Britain  65  60 55 46  38
Italy 56  47 42 35  30
The Netherlands  84  78 67 53  45
Spain 22  17 13 10  9
Sweden 58  55 46 42  36
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Table 5.4 One-earner couple aged 50 with social assistance 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
Denmark I  60  47 38 30  26
Denmark II  109  86 69 55  47
Finland 96  95 95 78  65
Great Britain  73  62 46 35  28
Italy 42  35 33 28  24
The Netherlands  98  92 77 62  52
Spain 13  10 8 6  5
Sweden 114  88 64 50  41
 
Table 5.5 Two-earner couple aged 50 with social assistance. Primary earner 
follows route. Two children 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
Denmark 98  84 67 58  48
Finland 62  56 49 41  35
Great Britain  84  72 56 39  34
Italy 72  61 53 32  33
The Netherlands  50  40 31 24  26
Spain 43  42 41 41  41
Sweden 83  72 57 45  38
 
Table 5.6 Two-earner couple aged 50 with social assistance. Secondary earner 
follows route. Two children 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
Denmark 101  89 72 65  63
Finland 72  64 48 46  49
Great Britain  85  74 60 57  57
Italy 67  66 63 61  61
The Netherlands  55  56 57 57  58
Spain 71  73 72 63  63
Sweden 83  72 58 58  58
 
Table 5.7 Two-earner couple aged 50 with social assistance. Both earners follow 
route. Two children 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
Denmark 97  83 66 53  44
Finland 60  52 41 33  28
Great Britain  79  67 52 41  34
Italy 48  41 34 27  22
The Netherlands  50  40 31 25  21
Spain 19  15 12 9  8
Sweden 83  72 57 45  38
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The aim of this chapter is primarily to follow the route from employment via unemployment 
to early retirement, and to assess the economic incentives for early retirement along this route. 
Most early retirement schemes can be accessed from both employment and unemployment, 
but not all. Where access to early retirement is possible from employment only, 
unemployment benefit may be an alternative income in case of a withdrawal from the labour 
market, e.g. in case of lay-offs. Therefore unemployment insurance schemes are relevant in 
this context. In addition, Finland has an early retirement scheme which is accessible only 
through unemployment. 
 
Denmark, Finland, Italy and Sweden have dedicated or close to dedicated public early 
retirement schemes. Other countries have early retirement options in private pension 
arrangements, e.g. Great Britain and the Netherlands. Spain and Sweden use the flexible old-
age pension scheme as a tool for early retirement.  
 
A dedicated early retirement scheme is one where the decision on early retirement is 
voluntary, where an agreement with the employer is not required and where no labour market 
obligations are attached. This is an ideal situation, rarely found in any country. The decision 
to be an early retiree may not seem to be very voluntary provided that this possibility is 
available, for instance, in a case where a person is unemployed and has little hope of getting a 
job again or  in a case  of staff reduction where options are limited to early retirement and 
unemployment. There is, however, a difference between early retirement because of health 
problems, as studied in the sickness-disability route and the type of early retirement studied 
here, but even this distinction may in some cases not be very obvious. 
 
6.2 Main schemes 
 
General remark. The main schemes for early retirement described in the following are often 
supplemented by other benefits such as housing benefits and different components from the 
social assistance scheme. These supplementary benefits can have a very substantial effect on 
the net replacement rates presented in this chapter and these schemes have been mentioned in 
the preceding chapters. The unemployment schemes have also been described earlier. The 
possibility of prolonged unemployment benefits will, however, be mentioned here, but these 




There is a dedicated public scheme for early retirement (Efterløn), which can be accessed 
from employment or unemployment. 
 
Eligibility: A long contribution record to this scheme together with that for unemployment 
insurance is required (25 years out of the last 30, transition arrangements as a consequence of 
new rules). Access can be from both employment and unemployment, and no agreement from 
the employer is required. The scheme can be entered from the age of 60, if later, there are 
different premiums. 
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Benefit level: The benefit, when entering at age 60, is 91% of the actual or potential 
unemployment benefit. If early retirement is postponed to the age of 62, the benefit is the 
actual or potential unemployment benefit. The benefit is taxable and there is no contribution 
for early retirement but continued contribution for unemployment insurance. The calculations 
presented in the following are based on the Efterløn scheme entered at the age of 60. The 
length of a preceding unemployment spell has no effect on the early retirement benefit. 
 
Benefit duration: The duration of the scheme is until the age of 65, the official retirement age 
from 2004. All who are born after July 1
st 1939, and meet the requirements, can join the 
scheme as described. 
 
Labour market requirements: There are no labour market conditions attached to being an 
early retiree. If it is possible to work the early retirement benefit is then reduced accordingly. 
The period for unemployment benefits can be extended. If the rights expire after the age of 55 
unemployment benefit can be received until the age of 60 if the conditions for joining the 





There are two schemes that can be used for early retirement. One is the early old age pension, 
which can be entered from employment or unemployment. The other is unemployment 
pension, which is accessible only through unemployment. However, the latter will be 
gradually phased out between 2009 and 2014. 
 
Early old-age pension: 
Eligibility: The eligibility requirements are the same as for the usual old age pension, but it is 
possible to take the pension from the age of 60. 
 
Benefit level: The benefit level corresponds to that for the old age pension accrued by the date 
of retiring.  If the pension is drawn from the age of 60, there is a reduction of 24 per cent for 
the rest of the life, compared to the pension starting at the age of 65. One set of calculations is 
based on this scheme, accessed at the age of 61 after two years of unemployment. 
 
Benefit duration: The duration of the scheme is five years, but the benefits continue as the 
old-age pension. 
 
Labour market requirements: There are no labour market requirements attached and it is 
possible to work and be an early retiree at the same time. 
 
Unemployment pension: 
Eligibility: This scheme is available for those in the 60-64 age bracket who have received 
unemployment benefit (earnings-related or basic benefit) for at least the maximum period 
(two years) of the standard unemployment benefit or for an extended period of at most three 
years. Additionally, they must have been employed for at least five years out of the last 15. 
 
Benefit level: The unemployment pension is calculated as an old-age pension, but the accrual 
rate is reduced during the preceding period of unemployment, implying that an unemploy-
ment pension will usually be slightly lower than a corresponding old-age pension entered 
from employment. The accrual rate for the old-age pension is reduced when receiving  
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unemployment pension. The second set of calculations is based on this scheme, entered at the 
age of 61 after two years of unemployment. 
 
Benefit duration: The duration of the unemployment pension scheme is five years and the 
pension is replaced by old-age pension from the age of 65. 
 
Labour market requirements: There are no labour market obligations attached.  
 
The unemployment pension follows the receipt of unemployment benefits of between two and 
five years. An extended unemployment benefit period is available for the unemployed aged 
57 or more until the age of 60.  Labour market obligations basically apply during this period 
but, in practice, the administration is not strict. The period on unemployment benefits forms a 
so-called ‘pipeline to unemployment pension’ for the unemployed persons in the age group 
55-59. 
 
There is also an individual early retirement scheme, which is a variant of the disability 
pension scheme for persons in the age group 58-64 (however, this scheme will be abolished in 
2005). The disability criteria in the scheme are based on age and work ability, which are more 
lax than in the ordinary disability scheme. The benefits received are equal to those from the 
ordinary disability pension scheme. Access to the individual early retirement scheme is not 
completely voluntary, but there are no labour market obligations attached. The accrual rate is 
somewhat lower than for old-age pension, but individual early retirement is more attractive 




There is no public dedicated early retirement scheme, but private schemes and schemes for 
public sector employees contain early retirement options. These schemes are accessed from 
employment only. 
 
Eligibility: 50 years of age is pivotal in Great Britain. Above that age an occupational pension 
will usually be received in case of early retirement. The pension may be actuarially reduced. 
 
Benefit level: A relatively poor outcome after 30 years of service would be a pension worth 50 
per cent of the final earnings and reduced for actuarial reasons by 25 per cent for the 60 year 
old and by 50 per cent for the 55 year old. A relatively generous outcome would be a pension 
worth 67 per cent of final earnings with no actuarial reductions. A final outcome could be the 
case of compulsory retirement or cases where the age plus the years in service (primarily 
public service) exceeds the figure 85. Many cases will be between these two outcomes. In the 
calculations presented here a 40 per cent compensation of the former wage has been used. 
 
Benefit duration: The pension is received as old age pension supplemented by national 
pension from the age of 65 (men) or 60 (women). 
 
Labour market requirements: There are no labour market requirements for an early retiree, 
who will be allowed to work, but not for the same firm. 
Italy  
The pension system was reformed in 1995 from an earnings-based system to one based on 
contributions. It maintained the seniority pensions (except for new registrants), but raised the 
number of years of contribution and/or the age requirements, in order to abolish the seniority  
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schemes gradually. The description here covers the seniority scheme for workers with more 
than 18 years of contributions paid up to 1995, as these workers, according to the rules 
enacted by the 1995 reform, continue to be treated under the old rules (the earnings-based 
award formula). This scheme can be used for early retirement and is accessible from 
employment or unemployment. 
 
Eligibility: Conditions for seniority pensions require a long contribution record (37 years), 
with no age requirements in 2000 (it will be raised to 40 years in 2008) or a slightly shorter 
contribution record (35 years) and a minimum age of 55 years in 2000 (increased to 57 in 
2002). Moreover, there is an early claim for a seniority pension for workers at risk of 
unemployment as a consequence of restructuring in specific industries or geographical areas. 
In practice, the principle of the early retirement scheme is to award a qualifying period (five 
years of insurance contributions), which covers the interval between termination of work and 
the years of entitlement to the seniority pension. Also, before finally entering the early 
retirement program there may be access to the unemployment benefit schemes. 
 
Benefit level: The amount of pension is based on the basic pre 1995 benefit formula: the 
accrual rate of two percent of the average earnings in the last ten years is multiplied by the 
number of contribution years. The calculations presented in the following are based on the 
early retirement scheme and refer to a worker with a shorter contribution record, that is 32 
years (28 years during the working life, plus four years during the unemployment status), 
instead of 37 years, as the worker benefits from five years of covered contributions 
(qualifying period). Accordingly, the worker is entitled to a pension equivalent of what would 
have been received if work had continued to reach the longer contribution record (37 years) 
for the seniority pension. The length of a preceding unemployment has an impact on the early 
retirement benefit, because the income during unemployment is lower. 
 
Benefit duration: The early retirement pension can be received for quite a long time, 10-12 
years before the ordinary pension and continues as old age pension. This is the maximum 
period and the assumption on which the calculations are based. Possibilities for early pensions 
from the seniority scheme have been significantly tightened since the mid 1990s and no more 
additional recipients have been authorised since 1998. 
 
Labour market requirements: There are no labour market requirements attached to the early 




There is no public early retirement scheme but some collective agreements, CAO’s, have 
special rules for early retirement. These schemes can be accessed from employment only. 
 
Eligibility: The age range for access to the scheme is from 58 to 63 years, typically 60 years. 
The usual requirement is 10 years of work within the same industrial sector immediately 
before early retirement. 
 
Benefit level: The compensation is usually 75-80 per cent of former gross income; a level of 
80 per cent is used for the calculations presented in the following. 
 
Benefit duration: The early retirement benefit continues as old age pension supplemented by a 
national basic pension from the age of 65 years.  
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Labour market requirements: There are no labour market requirements attached to being an 
early retiree. The early retiree can continue to work but the early retirement benefit will then 
be reduced accordingly.  
 
There is also a prolonged unemployment benefit scheme for the elderly unemployed in the 
Netherlands. They may receive unemployment benefit from the age of 57½ years until the 
ordinary old-age pension age of 65, although at a reduced rate for the last 3½ years. The 




The flexible old-age pension scheme is used for early retirement. The scheme can be accessed 
from employment or unemployment. 
 
Eligibility: The legal retirement age in Spain is 65. Nevertheless, workers belonging to the 
system before January 1
st 1967 are entitled to receive an early old-age retirement pension with 
a substantial reduction in benefits for the rest of their life. The age range for access to the 
scheme is from 60 to 64 years, typically 60 years (as assumed in the calculations). As a 
general rule, a long contribution record is required (35 years) and this has been assumed in the 
calculations. Workers with a contribution record of 40 years or more can get the pension with 
a smaller reduction (7 per cent per year instead of 8 per cent). The lower reduction alternative 
has been assumed here. 
 
Benefit level: The pension is based on an average contributed salary for the last 14 years. The 
average contributed salary is reduced by 7% for each year the pension is drawn before the age 
of 65. In the case where the pension is drawn at the age of 60 the reduction is by 35%. The 
pension is assumed to follow a period of two years of unemployment, but this makes no 
difference in the case where early retirement follows immediately after employment. A 
combined unemployment spell of more than two years may have an impact on the pension. 
 
Benefit duration: The early pension continues after the age of 65 as old-age pension. 
 
Labour market requirements: There is no labour market requirement attached to the scheme 
and the early retiree can also work in some jobs. Spain has also an extended unemployment 
benefit period for the unemployed aged 52 or above. They can continue receiving 




The flexible old-age pension scheme is used for early retirement. The scheme can be accessed 
from employment or unemployment. 
 
Eligibility: Sweden has a basic residence based pension which requires 40 years to obtain a 
full pension and an income based public occupational pension on top, which requires 30 years 
of work for a full pension. In case of a full occupational pension the requirement for a 
residence-based pension is reduced to 30 years. Both pensions can be drawn together from the 
age of 61, although at a reduction for actuarial reasons. 
 
Benefit level: The benefit level is that from the national pension supplemented by the public 
occupational pension scheme in Sweden. The national pension is flat rate, and the  
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occupational pension is related to former income, with a ceiling of 6.5 times the basic rate in 
the Swedish social security system. The pension is reduced when it is drawn early. The 
reduced pension is for the rest of life. It is also possible to take out shares of the pension, e.g. 
1/4, ½ or 3/4. If half of the pension is drawn early, only this half is actuarially reduced. Most 
Swedes also have a labour market agreed pension (avtalspension), comprising 10 per cent of 
earlier income. This can also be drawn early, actuarially reduced. In the calculations presented 
for Sweden both the early old-age pension and the early avtalspension are included, both are 
drawn from the age of 61. A preceding spell of unemployment could have an impact on the 
occupational part of the early pension. The unemployment spell is here assumed to be of a 
length where this is not the case. 
 
Benefit duration: The reduced pension is also received as old-age pension after the age of 65 
has been reached. 
 
Labour market requirements: There is no labour market requirement for an early retiree, and 
the early retiree can work without limitations. 
 
 
6.3 Access possibilities and duration of the systems 
 
All replacement rates for the route are contained in tables 6.3 – 6.7 of the appendix. The 
results for the low (67%) and average (100%) income cases have been selected for more 
detailed comments in the following. It is the route from employment (via unemployment) to 
early retirement, which is looked at. The replacements rates for early retirement will often be 
higher if early retirement follows directly after employment instead of after unemployment, 
cf. the appendix to chapter 6, ‘Separate net replacement rates’. Thus, a possible incentive 
problem in terms of net replacement rates in relation to work will be more evident in the case 
where early retirement follows immediately after employment. However, in the case of early 
retirement via unemployment, different factors may become important, such as the possibility 
of receiving a benefit continuously without labour market requirements, in particular if 
unemployment has already continued for some time and has thereby deteriorated the skill 
level of the persons concerned.  
 
The access options to dedicated early retirement systems are illustrated in table 6.1.  
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Maximum duration of 
unemployment just before 
early retirement 
Minimum age of 
early retirement 
Denmark Yes  Yes  9  years  60 
Finland Early old-age pension  Yes  Yes  Not defined  60 
Fin Unemployment pension  No  Yes  5 years   60 
Great Britain  Yes  No  Not applicable  Approx. 55 
Italy  Yes  Yes  ½ for UB to 4 years (or 
more) for Mobility benefit 
57 or sufficient 
contribution 
The Netherlands  Yes  No  Not applicable  Approx. 60 
Spain Yes  Yes  2  years  60 
Sweden Yes  Yes  No  effective  61 




Table 6.2 Duration of different systems 




Denmark 4+  5 
Finland 2+  5(+old) 
Great Britain  0.5 (Alt.)  10+ 
Italy 4  12+(+old) 
The Netherlands  0.5-5 (Alt.)  5+ 
Spain 2  5(+old) 
Sweden 1.2+  4(+old) 
 
Duration indicates the number of years, which can be spent in each scheme. For 
unemployment benefit '4+' indicates that the ordinary benefit period is four years, and that it 
can be prolonged. If relevant, the calculations are based on the maximum ordinary 
unemployment benefit period, for Finland this is two years of unemployment before early 
retirement. '12+(+old)' for Early Retirement indicates that the typical benefit period is 12 
years, that it can be longer and that it continues as an old age pension. For Finland only the 
early old-age pension is used. However, the benefit level in the unemployment pension would 
be almost identical in the case chosen here (after two years of unemployment and early 
retirement starting at the age of 61, one year after the earliest possible start). For Italy it is the 
Mobility case for unemployment insurance which has been used, because this was assumed to 
precede early retirement when the calculations were done. 'Alt.' indicates that early retirement 
is an alternative to unemployment and there is no access to early retirement from 
unemployment. 
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6.4 Replacement rates 
 
The relevant replacement rates at low and average income levels for all family types are 
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At the low income level Italy has an early retirement net replacement rate of 95 per cent and 
the Netherlands 86 per cent. For the other countries the rates are below 70 per cent. In Italy, 
the Netherlands, Finland and Great Britain, an early pension is advantageous compared to 
unemployment benefit, in Italy by a wide margin. In Denmark and Sweden it is the other way 
round and in Spain there is no difference. Italy and the Netherlands seem to have incentive 
problems for early retirement in relation to work at the low-income level with replacement 
rates above 80 per cent. 
 
Compared to the low-income level, the replacement rates for both unemployment and early 
retirement are substantially lower at the average income level except for Spain. In Spain they 
are higher, which is primarily due to the personal taxation scheme. It is still an advantage to 
be an early retiree compared to being unemployed in the most countries. In addition, because 
usually no labour market requirements apply to an early pension, the real incentive to 
withdraw from the labour market on an early pension instead of unemployment benefit is 




The next family type is the one-earner couple. This family type is relatively rare in the Nordic 
countries, where labour market participation among women is almost as high as for men. The 
family type is, however, quite frequent among immigrant families in the Nordic countries. It 
is anyhow of interest to see how the situation changes when the family size is augmented by 
one person, who in this case is a dependent spouse. In Denmark there is a differentiation 
between dependent spouses available and not available for the labour market as far as social 
assistance is concerned. This will be seen to have a significant impact in graph 6.2.  
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Graph 6.2 Early retirement route. Net replacement rates for a one-earner couple 
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Early retirement replacement rates at the low-income level are 109 per cent in Italy, 108 per 
cent in Denmark (case II where the dependent spouse is available for the labour market), 105 
per cent in Sweden (case II where the dependent spouse receives a residence based early 
pension), 95 per cent in the Netherlands and 87 per cent in Finland. In all other countries the 
replacement rates are below 75 per cent. Early retirement is advantageous compared to 
unemployment in Italy, Denmark II, Sweden II and Spain, in Italy and Sweden II by a 
considerable margin. In the other cases it is the other way round, but the differences are small 
except for Sweden I. Supplements for the dependent spouse have an impact on the rates in 
Finland, the Netherlands and Great Britain. In addition, in Denmark and Finland, social 
assistance is also involved. 
 
Italy, Denmark II, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden II have incentive problems for low-
income situations for early retirement in relation to work with rates above 80 per cent. For 
Denmark II, Finland and the Netherlands this is also the case for unemployment in relation to 
work. 
 
Most replacement rates are significantly lower at the average income level compared to those 
at the low-income level, except for Spain, where the opposite is the case, again caused by the 
taxation scheme. Italy and the Netherlands have relatively high replacement rates for early 




The two-earner couple is a more typical family type in Europe, and increasingly so. The 
following graphs cover three situations for this family type, which is now so old that there are 
no children living in the couple’s home. 
 
In the first situation the primary earner spouse becomes unemployed and retires early while 
the secondary earner continues to work part-time. The spouse’s income from work is included 
in the net replacement rates calculated for unemployment benefit and early retirement.  
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Graph 6.3 Early retirement route. Net replacement rates for a two-earner couple. 
Primary earner retires early 
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Denmark, the Netherlands and Italy have early retirement replacement rates of 95, 79 and 77 
per cent respectively at the low-income level. In these countries as well as in Great Britain 
and Spain, early retirement is advantageous compared to unemployment. The Danish case 
demonstrates the greatest incentive problems in relation to work.  
 
At the average income level, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain have higher net replacement 
rates in early retirement than at the low wage level. Also in Finland and Sweden, the 
replacement rates are about as high as for low-wage earner families. Moreover, in all 
countries except Sweden, early retirement provides a higher or at least the same benefit level 
than unemployment. Only in Denmark are the replacement rates markedly lower at the 
average wage level than at the low wage level, thus indicating a strong income redistribution 
element in benefit schemes and that benefits are close to being flat. At the same time, 
incentive problems tend to concentrate in low-income groups. 
 
The next situation for the two-earner family type is where the secondary income earner 
becomes unemployed from a part-time job and retires early, while the primary earner keeps 
on working. The net replacement rates reported in graph 6.4 include the wage income of the 
primary income earner. 
 
Graph 6.4 Early retirement route. Net replacement rates for a two-earner couple. 
Secondary earner retires early 
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The net replacement rates in this case are very high, both in unemployment and in early 
retirement. The working income from the primary earner spouse is of course the main reason 
for that. Most striking is the result for Finland, where there is a gain from early retirement 
both in relation to work and unemployment at this low-income level. Close behind are 
Denmark and Sweden, where the loss in family purse income from early retirement of the low 
earner spouse is only 4-6 per cent at this income level. The small loss in the disposable 
income of the family is due to the fact that the low earner spouse in part-time work 
contributes only 1/3 of the total gross wage of the working family. In early retirement, 
however, he or she is often entitled to a minimum pension, which is likely to be higher than 
what the normal accrual rate would imply. The very modest loss is a strong incentive for a 
part-time working spouse in the Nordic countries and in Spain to retire early if the hourly 
wage is low. For the remaining countries, the loss is in the range of 11-15 percent of income, 
still very modest. There are clear incentive problems in relation to work both from 
unemployment and in particular from early retirement in all seven countries, but most 
seriously in the Nordic countries and Spain. 
 
The replacement rates for early retirement are somewhat lower at the average income level, 
but still indicate incentive problems in relation to work, at least in six of the countries, and 
also in relation to unemployment benefit. 
 
The general result for the two-earner couple where the low-income spouse is unemployed or 
an early retiree is that the loss in income is very small compared to the situation where both 
spouses work, also at the APW level. 
 
The third situation for the two-earner couple is that both spouses are unemployed at the same 
time, and that both spouses retire early at the same time. 
 
 
Graph 6.5 Early retirement route. Net replacement rates for a two-earner couple. Both 
earners retire early 
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The replacement rates for early retirement at the low-income level are typically around 70 per 
cent, lower in Great Britain and Sweden. However, early retirement results in higher 
replacement rates than unemployment benefit in most countries. 
 
Most replacement rates for early retirement are lower at the average income level than at the 
low-income level except for Italy and the Netherlands, where there are small increases. This is 
also the case for Spain but this time only for unemployment benefit.   
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6.5 Main findings 
 
Early retirement results in higher net replacement rates than unemployment benefit in most 
countries, both at the low and average wage levels, with the most striking gains in Italy and 
Great Britain. For a single person, incentive problems in relation to work are obvious in Italy 
and the Netherlands. The one-earner couple can also have very strong incentives for early 
retirement in relation to work.  For a low-earner spouse in the two-earner couple, the 
incentives to early retirement are also very strong at the lower income levels in most 
countries. This is also the case for the primary earner spouse at low-income levels in Denmark 
and to some extent over a broader income range in the Netherlands, Italy and Spain. 
 
In general, the Netherlands and Italy have high and constant replacement rates across the 
entire income interval, in particular for the two-earner couple. The Dutch results are based on 
occupational schemes agreed between social partners while the Italian ones are based on the 
public seniority pension scheme. The Swedish replacement rates (Sweden I for the one-earner 
couple) are also relatively constant across the income interval. Swedish replacement rates for 
an early pension are lower than the Italian ones, owing to the actuarial reduction of the old 
age pension when drawn at the age of 61 in Sweden, while there is no such reduction in the 
current Italian public early retirement scheme. In Sweden II (one-earner couple) the 
dependent spouse also receives a reduced basic pension based on residence. The Spanish 
replacement rates are also relatively stable and mostly at a level between Sweden and Italy. 
 
The schemes of Denmark and Great Britain and to some extent also that of Finland have a 
strong income distribution effect, either through high minimum or relatively flat-rate benefits 
or tapered benefits due to means-testing. Denmark can have some very high replacement rates 
at the lower income levels, especially for the one-earner couple. Finnish replacement rates can 
also be very high at lower income levels. 
 
Furthermore, when assessing early retirement schemes relative to unemployment benefits, one 
has to bear in mind that the early pension is usually granted for a longer period of time and 
that the requirements concerning the availability for labour markets are weak or absent. Thus, 
in particular in the case where unemployment has continued for some time and the prospects 
of a return to employment are weak, early retirement schemes can become very attractive. 
 
It should be noted that the Dutch and the British schemes are occupational early retirement 
schemes and funded privately. There is a great provision of such schemes in these two 
countries. The schemes chosen in this study do not reflect the variation between available 
schemes but they have been chosen to represent large and usual schemes. It is probably 
correct to say that the Dutch scheme seems to be more generous in terms of the benefit level 
at a given age of the retiree than the British one. However, the British pension can be drawn 
earlier than the Dutch one. 
  
6.6 Appendix to chapter 6 
 
Separate net replacement rates based on the family purse income concept are presented in the 
following tables for early retirement. The corresponding replacement rates for unemployment 
have been presented in the appendix to chapter 4. Unemployment is not always part of the 
route to early retirement, but then unemployment may be an alternative to early retirement, 
and therefore also of relevance. This is the case for Great Britain and the Netherlands. 
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The term separate has to be understood in a special way. Sometimes the replacement rates for 
early retirement are dependent on the former step. This is the case for Denmark for the one 
earner couple II (cf. the note for table 6.4) and the two-earner couple where each spouse 
retires in turn. In these cases, social assistance is also among the benefits received in early 
retirement if unemployment is the former step, unemployment is a social event, which is an 
eligibility criterion for social assistance. If employment is the former step, it is not possible to 
receive social assistance in early retirement, because early retirement is not a social event. For 
other countries the contribution or income during unemployment may have an impact on the 
early retirement benefit. This is the case for Finland and Italy and could be the case for Spain 
and Sweden (but in the calculations presented here it is assumed to have no impact). The 
replacement rates for early retirement presented in the table are in principle dependent on the 
route approach of this study. They cannot always be taken out of this context and used as 
independent building blocks. For Great Britain and the Netherlands it is not meaningful to 
talk about this route, unemployment may be an alternative to early retirement, which can be 
entered only from employment. Where it matters, early retirement replacement rates have 
been calculated after an unemployment spell equivalent to the maximum ordinary benefit 
period in the unemployment insurance scheme assumed to precede early retirement in the 
calculations. For Italy this period is four years in the Mobility scheme, for Finland two years 
in the Unemployment Benefit scheme.  
 
The net replacement rates presented for unemployment in the graphs are the same as those in 
chapter 4, except for the two-earner couple. In the previous chapter the couple had two 
children, this is not the case in the early retirement route. Even when children have no impact 
on the unemployment benefit they have an impact on disposable income in both the in-work 
and out-of-work situations because of family allowances and eligibility to housing benefits in 
some countries. The net replacement rates when family allowances are involved are usually 
higher than without them. 
 
Table 6.3 Single person aged around 60 in early retirement 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
Denmark  68 53 42 33 28
Finland Early ret  67 55 47 51 54
Fin Unempl pension  67 55 48 52 55
Great Britain  56 46 37 30 26
Italy  95 65 70 70 70
The Netherlands  86 69 72 74 77
Spain  53 60 63 63 64
Sweden  46 45 47 50 47
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Table 6.4 One-earner couple aged around 60 in early retirement 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
Denmark I  73 58 47 37 32
Denmark II  108 86 69 55 47
Finland Early ret.  87 75 60 53 54
Fin Unempl pension  87 75 60 54 55
Great Britain  72 61 48 38 33
Italy  109 69 75 72 71
The Netherlands  95 84 77 79 78
Spain  51 55 61 65 66
Sweden I  46 45 47 50 47
Sweden II  105 91 80 75 68
Note: Denmark I is where the dependent spouse is not available for the labour market, 
Denmark II is where the spouse is available. Sweden I is where only the ‘active’ spouse 
receives an early old-age pension, Sweden II is where the dependent spouse also receives an 
early pension. Finland  (one earner couple) corresponds to Sweden I. 
 
Table 6.5 Two-earner couple aged around 60. Primary earner in early retirement 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
Denmark  95 80 62 55 53
Finland Early ret.  69 66 67 70 72
Fin Unempl pension  69 66 68 70 72
Great Britain  63 54 50 46 45
Italy  77 77 80 82 81
The Netherlands  79 81 83 84 86
Spain  70 75 77 77 77
Sweden  65 65 66 68 66
 
Table 6.6 Two-earner couple aged around 60. Secondary earner in early retirement 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
Denmark  94 93 88 82 78
Finland Early ret.  106 98 91 87 84
Fin Unempl pension  106 98 91 87 85
Great Britain  85 79 73 69 65
Italy  87 88 90 89 89
The Netherlands  89 89 90 91 91
Spain  98 90 84 86 88
Sweden  96 93 89 87 85
 
Table 6.7 Two-earner couple aged around 60. Both earners in early retirement 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
Denmark  73 66 50 39 32
Finland Early ret.  69 61 57 55 55
Fin Unempl pension  68 62 58 56 56
Great Britain  59 50 40 34 33
Italy  67 66 70 71 70
The Netherlands  68 71 73 75 77
Spain  67 64 61 62 65
Sweden  53 53 51 52 49 
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7 SICKNESS AND DISABILITY ROUTE 
 
7.1 Introduction 
A person who is not able to work due to sickness or impairment is entitled to a sickness or 
disability benefit in all countries. This situation is mostly not voluntary, since the person 
could not avoid the impairment. The benefit must ensure that the endured condition does not 
lead to social and economic hardship. One of the most difficult questions has been how to 
design a benefit that prevents those who cannot work from poverty, but also prevents people 
who could still work to get this benefit instead of trying to work. This could endanger the 
funding of the benefit. It is the aim of this chapter to follow some typical sickness and 
disability cases and to assess the economic incentives coming from the schemes. These 
incentives are particularly important in the case where the scheme can be misused or 
administrated negligently in a way which allows its use as a substitution for early retirement 
schemes. 
 
The disability benefit is always preceded by a period of sickness pay. For the first few days or 
weeks the employer pays the salary in case of sickness, then a sickness payment follows from 
sickness insurance. The sickness payment lasts for about a year, during which there should be 
rehabilitation. If rehabilitation is not successful the claimant has to apply for a disability 
benefit. This chapter starts with an overview of the sickness benefit regulation before 
describing the disability benefit regulation. 
 
In all cases full disability is assumed in order to simplify the comparison. In this study the 
claimants will always receive a full benefit. Full disability means that the person cannot work 
at all. Schemes vary in the degrees of disability and the combination of work and benefits. 
Some countries also have a partial benefit for a person that could work part-time, in other 
countries the benefit depends on an ‘All-or-Nothing-decision’ of the authorised benefit 
organisation. A graduation of severity is in some cases also made by different systems, e.g. 
there are four different benefit schemes for the disabled in Spain. 
 
In most countries the entitlement to the benefit also depends on a certain eligibility period. 
Employees usually have to work for some time before being entitled to a disability benefit. 
The length of this period can vary. In the cases calculated all employees have satisfied the 
eligibility period. 
 
General remark: In many countries sickness and disability regulations are also a component 
of collective labour market agreements. These contracts may have improved the situation of 
the sick and disabled substantially. Therefore public insurance regulations represent minimum 
norms for income support. People might be better off than what is calculated in the 
replacement rates. 
 
7.2 Sickness benefit schemes 
 
Denmark 
A sickness insurance benefit is available for employees, self-employed and co-working 
spouses in the company of the self-employed. 
 
Eligibility: The employer - if not paying a wage - has the obligation to pay sickness benefits 
to the sick employee for the first two weeks. The employee must have worked for at least 
eight weeks with this employer for a total of 74 hours. Due to collective agreements most  
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Benefit level: The sickness insurance benefits are based on an hourly rate. The benefit is the 
former hourly wage times the weekly hours (37 hours in Denmark). The benefit is 100% of 
the former wage if the wage is below a certain threshold (€1,650 per month excluding 8% 
social contributions). Sickness insurance benefits are taxable, but the social contribution of 
8% is not levied. The employer pays the benefit for two weeks. After that the municipal 
authority is responsible for the payment and a draft rehabilitation plan. If rehabilitation fails a 
disability pension is granted. 
 
Benefit duration: After these two weeks the employee receives benefits from sickness 
insurance. The maximum benefit period is 52 weeks. It can be prolonged if the prospect for 




Eligibility: A sickness benefit is paid to employees and the self-employed after a waiting 
period of nine weekdays. The employee must have worked for at least three months in order 
to be entitled to the benefit. However, due to collective agreements, the employee receives a 
normal wage during the first four to eight weeks. 
 
Benefit level: The sickness benefit depends on a person’s taxable income (in 2000 the 
reference year was 1998). If earnings have been too low the benefit is not paid. The amount is 
also adjusted to the employment pension contribution (about 5%). This means that 5% is 
deducted from a person’s income before calculating benefit. The actual reference income is 
about 95% of 1998 taxable income. The benefit is about 70% of the former wage up to APW. 
Employees earning more than APW get a slightly lower percentage. Sickness insurance 
benefit is taxable. Next to the sickness benefit a person may also qualify for a disability 
allowance if their functional capacity is at least reduced for one year. The additional disability 
allowance is not taxable. 
 
Benefit duration: The insurance sickness benefit is paid for up to 50 weeks.
10 Application for 
a disability pension is only possible after rehabilitation remains unsuccessful. During 




Eligibility: Employees can get Statutory Sick Payment (SSP) paid by the employer during the 
first 28 weeks of sickness after a waiting period of three days. Self-employed or employees 
for whom employers are not required to pay SSP (e.g. part-time or short-term contracts) 
receive a short-term incapacity benefit (lower rate). After 28 weeks the short-term incapacity 
benefit (higher rate) is paid to everyone that meets the eligibility criteria. The short-term 
incapacity benefit requires a defined period of incapacity for work (more than four days in a 
row) and sufficient contribution payments. Next, a person must not be eligible for SSP and be 
under pension age.  
                                                 
9 In case of wage payments the sickness benefit is paid to the employer. 
10 The regulation says 300 days including Saturdays. The 300 days are renewed after having worked for at least 
one year.  
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Benefit level: The standard flat rate for statutory sickness payment is currently €95 per week, 
with additional payments for dependants. Incapacity benefit is taxable after 28 weeks of 
incapacity. Other benefits, like a disability living allowance or attendance allowance, can be 
paid on top. Incapacity benefit is not means tested. 
 
Benefit duration: After 52 weeks the benefit converts to a long-term incapacity benefit. The 




Eligibility: Employers are required to pay sickness payments to their employees, after three 
waiting days. Included in the regulation are all employees in the private sector. The National 
Social Security Institute reimburses the payment. 
 
Benefit level: The sickness payment corresponds to 50% of former daily gross wages up to the 
20
th day. Then it increases to 66%. However, collective contracts set wage supplements that 
vary according to sectors and length of employment. Therefore workers with at least six years 
of contributions receive a sickness payment equal to 100% of their gross former earnings for 
the first six months, which then is reduced to 50% after six months for a maximum period of 
18 months. Income from insurance benefit is taxable income. 
 




There is no public sickness insurance. 
 
Eligibility: Employers usually pay sickness payments during the first year of sickness, after 
two optional waiting days. The Sickness Benefit Act serves as a safety net for employees, 
who do not have an employer and in some special circumstances like temporary work, 
voluntarily insured and self-employed. Sick pay is also possible in the event of sickness 
resulting from childbirth, pregnancy, bankruptcy of the employer and some other specific 
events. 
 
Benefit level: According to government regulations employers have to pay 70% of the former 
wage, but due to collective agreements nearly every employee gets 100% of the former wage. 
Employers never have to pay longer than the duration of the contract. Income from sick pay is 
taxable income. If the sickness payment is below the guaranteed minimum income level, the 
employee can also get other income support. 
 
Benefit duration: After 52 weeks of sick leave it will be reviewed whether the employee is 




Eligibility: A temporary incapacity benefit is paid to all employees from the fourth day of 
sickness, after three optional waiting days. Up to the 15
th working day the employer pays 
sickness payments, after that period the social security insurance pays. The employer may 
voluntarily cooperate with the social security insurance and pay the sickness payments  
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directly as a form of topping up. To be eligible for a sickness benefit from the social insurance 
a contribution record of at least 180 working days is needed. 
 
Benefit level: The temporary incapacity benefit is calculated on the basis of the last month’s 
contribution and the amount of contributions paid so far. Between the 4
th and 20
th day, 60% of 
this basis is paid, from the 21
st day onwards 75% of the base is paid. Income from incapacity 
benefit is taxable. 
 
Benefit duration: The benefit is granted for a maximum of 12 months with a possible 
extension for another six months if improvement is expected. Afterwards the employee is 




Eligibility: There is a compulsory public insurance scheme covering all citizens, including 
residents of another nationality, who are working and registered at the National Social 
Insurance Board. Self-employed are also included. The insurance includes all persons with an 
estimated income of minimum €1,029 (SEK8,800). There is no qualification period. A 
sickness benefit is paid in the event of sickness, which reduces work capacity by at least 25%. 
It is payable after one waiting day, also in case of short-term employment contracts after 14 
working days. 
 
Benefit level: The employer is required to pay 80% of the current wage during the first 14 
days plus another 10% due to collective agreements up to 90 days. Between the 15
th and the 
90
th day a social insurance benefit is paid at 80% of the former wage. Income from sickness 
benefits is taxable income. 
 
Benefit duration: After the 90
th day rehabilitation efforts should start. During this period the 
claimant receives a rehabilitation benefit. The benefit period is in principle unlimited but 
sickness insurance is often replaced by disability pension after a period of 360-450 days.  
 
 
7.3 Disability benefit schemes 
 
General remark: All countries, except the Netherlands
11, maintain another compensation 
scheme for work injuries alongside the disability scheme, which is not considered in this 
study. This scheme usually has less restricted eligibility criteria and accepts lower degrees of 
disability, but can only be applied to a limited number of work related impairments. For this 




The disability benefit is a pension related scheme. 
Eligibility: The working capability must be reduced by at least 50 per cent and the reduction 
must be permanent. The disability pension scheme is residence based. It is a universal 
scheme. There is no occupational dependent component. In order to receive a full pension the 
claimant should have lived 4/5 of his life in Denmark after the 15
th year. Otherwise the 
pension is reduced accordingly. 
                                                 
11 The Netherlands incorporated this scheme in the disability benefit, which is the reason why there is no 
contribution record required in the Netherlands. It is also the reason for the low degree for partial benefits.  
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Benefit level: The pension consists of a series of flat rates. The basic amount (€550 per 
month) is means tested against own income. The supplement depends on disability level and 
household type. A pension at the highest level is (incl. basic amount) €1,740 for a single and 
€1,450 for a married person. Except for some supplements the benefit is taxable income. 
 
Benefit duration: A disability pension is paid to a person who’s working capability is severely 
reduced or lost due to long term sickness or impairment up to the age of 67, when the 




The disability pension is granted according to the same rules applied to old-age pensions, both 
as regards the national basic pension and the earnings-related occupational pension. 
 
Eligibility: The benefit is granted to claimants with a sickness or injury, which reduces the 
functional capacity for at least 12 months. The earnings-related pension is available for all 
persons that have accrued pension rights during gainful employment. This benefit is not 
means tested. The national basic pension provides a minimum income guarantee and may 
supplement a small earnings-related disability pension or may be granted alone if no pension 
rights have been accrued in employment. 
 
Benefit level: The earnings-related pension consists of two components: acquired rights from 
work and rights granted for the years after the event until the official retirement age.  The 
granted rights are 1.5% of the calculated pension base per year up to the age of 50, then 1.2% 
until age 59 and 0.8% until age 64. Disability pension is taxable income. 
 
Benefit duration: At the age of 65 the disability pension converts into an old age pension. The 




Eligibility: The claimant is required to do a personal capability test before receiving the long-
term disability benefit. Entitlement is similar to the sickness regulations. 
 
Benefit level: The benefit consists of a flat rate of currently €107 per week, with supplements 
for dependants and severity of sickness. There is also some differentiation according to age. 
The benefit is not means tested. 
 
Benefit duration: The short-term incapacity benefit changes to a long-term incapacity benefit 




The National Social Security Institute administers two levels of disability benefits for the 




                                                 
12 There exists another disability scheme, which is rather a concept of social assistance than a compensatory or 
pension scheme and is therefore left out.  
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Eligibility: The invalidity allowance is granted in case of a 2/3 working capacity reduction, 
which is defined through a medical assessment. The disability pension is granted in case of a 
permanent incapacity for any kind of occupation due to medical conditions. To obtain one of 
these benefits, a claimant must have paid five years of contributions, with at least three years 
of contributions within the last five years. 
 
Benefit level: The invalidity allowance and the disability pension are calculated according to 
the same criteria as the old-age pension. According to the earning-based pension system rules, 
there is a minimum benefit threshold for the invalidity allowance, which is set currently at 
€4,845 per year, corresponding to the yearly minimum pension. If the accrued allowance is 
lower than the threshold it is topped up to the minimum. However, this supplement is subject 
to entitlement conditions, mainly based on the recipient taxable income, which cannot be 
above twice the amount of the social pension (€8,642) for the single, or three times the social 
pension for a couple (€12,963). The definition of income adopted while assessing the right to 
the supplement corresponds to the household’s taxable income raised by the value of the top 
up allowance. The household is supposed to possess no income from real estate or financial 
assets with the exception of the residential home ownership. 
 





The disability benefit is an insurance benefit related to work rather than to pensions. 
Eligibility: All employees with an employment contract that are considered disabled for at 
least one year or more after a medical assessment are eligible. The degree of disability must 
be at least 15% for a partial benefit and at least 80% for a full benefit. There are no insurance 
preconditions. For self-employed and persons that become disabled before even having 
started to work, there exists a similar system. The benefit is not means tested. 
 
Benefit level: The amount of benefit depends on a) the degree of disability and b) the 
employee’s last earned wage (daily pay) as well as the age. The degree of disability is 
determined on the basis of a person’s remaining earning capacity. The minimum benefit is 
14% of the former wage and the highest benefit is 70% of the former wage. A 70%benefit is 
paid for less than one year for persons under the age of 32 up to six years for a person aged 59 
and older. The follow-up benefit is at minimum wage level plus a supplement. The 
supplement depends on age and the former wage. Due to collective agreements the income of 
a fully disabled never falls below 70% of former wage. If the benefit is lower than the 
guaranteed minimum income, the claimant can receive a supplement. The disability benefit is 
taxable income. 
 




The disability benefit is related to labour market activities. Four types of disability are 
distinguished: (1) partial disability for the own profession, (2) total incapacity for the own 
profession, (3) absolute permanent incapacity for any work and (4) severe disability. Severe 
disability means that the person needs constant assistance. 
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Eligibility: To be eligible a person must have worked half the time between the age of 16 and 
26 or a quarter of the time between the age of 20 and the beginning of the sickness when 
being older than 26. In the calculations here the third type is assumed: absolute permanent 
incapacity for any work. 
 
Benefit level: The benefit for the third type is 100% of the contribution base and cannot be 
lower than €5,048 per year for a single and €5,945 for a person with a spouse. The benefit 
type used in the calculations is non-taxable income, but not all disability benefits are non-
taxable income. 
 




The disability benefit scheme is a compulsory public insurance scheme for all citizens and 
foreign residents with at least three years residence. The benefit consists of a basic pension 
and a supplementary pension. 
 
Eligibility: The basic pension requires no former working record. A person must have been a 
resident for 40 years or worked for 30 years with supplementary pension rights to get a 
complete disability pension. If the conditions for residence or work are not fulfilled, the 
pension is reduced by 1/40 or 1/30 for every year missing. Pension rights will be granted for 
the years missing from when the disability occurs until the official retirement age of 65. 
 
Benefit level: The pension can be paid fully or reduced by three-quarters, half or one-quarter 
according to the degree of disability. The pension can be temporary or permanent. In the 
calculations, permanent incapacity for any work is assumed. A full basic pension is 202.9 per 
cent of the base amount for a single and 185.4 per cent for a person with a spouse. The net 
minimum pension after taxation was €8,803 (SEK74,300) for a single and €8,045 
(SEK67,900) for a person with a spouse. The supplementary pension is based on a formula 
including gross work income and personally accrued pension rights per year. All public 
pensions are taxable income, but a special pension deduction of the same size makes basic 
pension not taxed. A minimum pensioner may also apply for pensioners’ housing supplement 
, which may cover 90% of the rent. 
 
Benefit duration: A permanent pension is converted into an old age pension at the age of 65. 
 
7.4 Main findings about the systems 
 
Most countries in principle have a system where the employer pays in the beginning, then 
sickness insurance, eventually rehabilitation and finally disability insurance. There are two 
different types of disability schemes: schemes related to pensions and schemes closely related 
to sickness and (the incapacity to) work. Pension schemes seem to have a more permanent 
character than other schemes. They are also more often linked to ‘rehabilitation first’. Other 
systems are more integrated like in Great Britain and the Netherlands. These countries 
integrated sickness and disability or abolished the compulsory sickness insurance in order to 
increase the employer’s responsibility for integration. These schemes emphasise early 
reintegration into the labour market.  
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The benefit is either a flat rate or depends on former income or insurance contributions. A flat 
rate is generally more advantageous for lower incomes or younger people. A contribution-
based benefit is more favourable for older workers who have built a high contribution record 
or for people who have reached a high income. Incentives also vary according to the 
composition of the benefit. There are differences between compensatory systems and systems 
with universal coverage. The size of the benefit also varies with regard to age, severity of 
disability and family type. Incentives also might depend on (high) supplements. 
 
 
7.5 Replacement rates 
 
Net replacement rates for sickness and disability based on the family purse income concept 
are presented below for different family types. Besides the compensation from sickness and 
disability, the rates also include other benefits the person might be entitled to like housing 
subsidies, (municipal) tax credits and children’s allowances. The replacement rates for 
disability are always calculated for a fully disabled person, which means that the person 
cannot work at all (due to capacity or government regulation). A sickness benefit lasts in most 
countries for about one year, after that time a disability benefit is granted. 
 
The net replacement rate for disability pension in Spain has a tendency to increase when 
income increases. This is due to the fact that the disability pension is exempted from personal 
income tax and that a progressive income tax schedule applies for earned income. The family 
purse income is affected by the progressive tax on wages and the absence of tax on disability 





Graph 7.1 Sickness benefit and disability pension. Net replacement rates for a single 




























Two of the countries, Great Britain and the Netherlands, always have replacement rates of 
100 per cent in case of sickness, assuming that usual wages are paid also in that situation. 
This is clearly more than public (or privatised) insurance schemes usually provide. The other 
countries have replacement rates between 65 and 80 per cent at the low-income level. 
 
Disability pensions result in replacement rates of 142 per cent in Denmark, 115 per cent in 
Spain, 111 per cent in Sweden and 107 per cent in Italy. Finland and the Netherlands also  
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have high replacement rates of 87 and 82 per cent respectively. Disability is not voluntary, but 
the compensation is generous at the low-income level in all countries, except Great Britain. 
Disability compensation is also higher than for sickness, except in Great Britain and the 
Netherlands. Particularly wide margins are seen in Denmark, Italy, Spain and Sweden.  
 
At the average income level the sickness replacement rates are a little higher than at the low-
income level in Italy, Spain and Sweden but still below 80 per cent. In Great Britain and the 
Netherlands, they remain at the same level of 100 per cent. 
 
Disability replacement rates are mostly lower than in low-income situations, there is only a 
rise in Spain. In Great Britain and the Netherlands, there are no incentive problems, with 
replacement rates of 41 and 60 per cent. In Italy with 83 per cent and Denmark with 88 per 
cent, there might be and in Spain, peaking at more than 120 per cent, there should be an 
incentive problem even if disability is not a voluntary outcome. 
 
Graph 7.2 Sickness benefit and disability pension. Net replacement rates for a single 
parent aged 40 with two children 
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For the single parent, Great Britain and the Netherlands have assumed sickness replacement 
rates to be 100 per cent. In Denmark at 89 per cent, Finland at 102 per cent, Italy at 78 per 
cent and Sweden at 90 per cent, the sickness replacement rates are also high. Only Spain has a 
low compensation at the low-income level with 45 per cent. 
 
Disability replacement rates are above 100 per cent in Denmark and Spain and higher than 80 
per cent in all the other countries except Great Britain at 65 per cent. Disability results in a 
higher compensation than sickness in Denmark, Italy, Spain and Sweden, but the margins are 
narrower than for a single person at the low-income level, except in Spain, due to favourable 
taxation of benefits. 
 
At the average income level, Spain has a disability replacement rate above 100 per cent and 
the other countries also have rates of above 80 per cent, except Great Britain and the 





The situation for a couple with one income is presented in the graph below, assuming that 
both partners are 50 years old.  
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Graph 7.3 Sickness benefit and disability pension. Net replacement rates for a one-
earner couple aged 50 
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Note: DK I the partner is not available for the labour market 
DK II the partner is available for the labour market 
 
The disability replacement rates for this family are 100 per cent or more in all countries 
except in Great Britain and Italy, where they are approximately 80 per cent. Except in Great 
Britain, the rates are equal to or above the replacement rates for sickness. The Danish case, 
where the spouse receives social assistance, is extraordinary in reaching a replacement rate of 
close to 160 per cent at the low-income level. 
 
At the average income level, replacement rates from disability are still high, in most cases 
between 80 per cent and 100 per cent and mostly higher than in the case of sickness. 
 
The general impression from these one-earner families (single, single parent and one-earner 
couple) is that compensation for disability results in high or very high replacement rates and 
mostly also higher than for sickness in most countries. This is the case at both the low-income 
level and the average income level. It is hardly relevant to use the concept of incentives in the 
usual way here, but in purely financial terms disability is often preferable to work. This gives 
reasons to ask whether such a high compensation is justified and it draws attention to the 
eligibility rules and a proper administration of such schemes because a lax administration may 





In most countries the most common situation nowadays is a situation where both partners are 
working. There are three possible situations for the case of a couple with two incomes and 
two children:  
 
1) The primary earner gets sick and disabled, 
2)  The secondary earner gets sick and disabled 
3)  And the worst case, both get sick and disabled 
 
In all cases is assumed that the secondary earner is a part-time worker with half the income of 
the primary earner.  
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Graph 7.4 Sickness benefit and disability pension. Net replacement rates for a two-
earner couple aged 50 with two children. Primary earner follows the route 
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For a two-earner family, where the primary earner becomes disabled, the compensation 
together with the income from part-time work of the spouse, results in replacement rates close 
to 100 per cent. In Denmark the rate is almost 120 per cent, while the Netherlands are at the 
other end of the range with 74 per cent at the low-income level. Replacement rates for 
sickness are somewhat lower, except in Great Britain and the Netherlands where they are 
assumed to be 100 per cent. 
 
At the average income level most replacement rates for disability are between 80 and 90 per 
cent, but in Spain the rate increases to 115 per cent due to favourable taxation of benefits. 
 
Graph 7.5 Sickness benefit and disability pension. Net replacement rates for a two-
earner couple aged 50 with two children.  Secondary earner follows the route 
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In the case where the secondary earner gets sick, the replacement rates are at least as high as 
in the case where the primary earner gets sick in all countries. At all income levels 
replacement rates are relatively similar because the influence on household income of the 
secondary earner is not so important for the overall household income. 
 
Again replacement rates related to disability are even higher than the former income in some 
countries like Denmark, Sweden and Spain. This effect is most obvious with low incomes, but 
in Spain also with high incomes due to favourable taxation of benefits. In Denmark low-
income families in particular have high replacement rates. Compared to the situation where  
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the primary earner gets disabled, replacement rates are higher. The main reason is that the 
income from part-time work of the secondary earner has only minor importance on the total 
family income, while a disability pension is high relative to income from work. 
 
Graph 7.6 Sickness benefit and disability pension. Net replacement rates for a two-
earner couple aged 50 with two children. Both earners follow route 









DK FIN GB IT NL SP SW
Sickness Disability
 













When both spouses are sick or disabled at the same time, the replacement rates are mostly 
somewhat lower than in the two preceding cases, but still remarkably high, both at the low 
and average income level. The replacement rates in several cases are well above 100 per cent. 
 
 
7.6 Main findings 
 
Compared to other schemes, sickness and disability schemes yield the highest replacement 
rates. Replacement rates show that net income is even higher than that from the former wage 
in many cases. With regard to incentives that stimulate work, this effect is concerning, but one 
has to keep in mind that disability is due to certain medical conditions and in most cases not a 
condition that can be influenced by the individual.  
 
In general, the countries which regard the disability scheme as a pension scheme, have higher 
replacement rates. These schemes are designed in such a way that people are not expected to 
return to work. Often, they also offer benefits that may be higher than those offered to people 
in rehabilitation or those granted for a temporary period to people who are expected to 
recover. 
 
In most countries replacement rates for disability decline when income rises. This is not the 
case in Spain, where replacement rates rise with increasing income. This occurs because there 
is no taxation of disability pensions. 
 
The replacement rates also reflect strongly the nature of the benefit, showing ‘staircase-like’ 
rates for flat rate benefits and similar percentage rates for different income levels in insurance 
schemes that are based on contributions on former wages. Flat rates are more advantageous 
for lower incomes than for higher incomes. A high, flat rate benefit therefore causes high 
replacement rates for low-income households.  
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7.7 Appendix to chapter 7 
 
Net replacement rates based on the family purse income are presented in the following tables 
for all income levels in the sickness and disability route. Extracts of the data are presented and 
analysed in the graphs in the chapter. 
 
The income of the primary earner is shown in the head of the table for two-earner couples. 
The wage level of the secondary earner is half of that level.  
 
 
Table 7.1 Single person aged 50 with sickness or disability benefits 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
SICKNESS       
Denmark 74  57 46 36  30
Finland 80  80 79 75  72
Great Britain  100  100 100 100  100
Italy 66  68 73 73  73
The Netherlands  100  100 100 100  100
Spain 64  70 71 71  72
Sweden 68  71 73 73  61
DISABILITY    
Denmark 142  110 88 69  58
Finland 87  80 72 71  71
Great Britain  65  55 41 31  25
Italy 107  78 83 81  82
The Netherlands  82  64 60 62  66
Spain 115  121 126 129  132
Sweden 111  92 77 80  80
 
 
Table 7.2 Single parent aged 40 with two children aged 3 and 6 with sickness  
or disability benefits 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
SICKNESS       
Denmark 89  82 72 63  55
Finland 102  93 95 89  82
Great Britain  100  100 100 100  100
Italy 78  78 84 79  77
The Netherlands  100  100 100 100  100
Spain 45  64 68 73  73
Sweden 90  89 88 83  72
DISABILITY    
Denmark 111  101 89 78  69
Finland 94  92 90 84  79
Great Britain  65  62 57 51  45
Italy 86  83 87 87  84
The Netherlands  84  76 71 62  64
Spain 110  109 112 118  122
Sweden 93  92 91 87  84 
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Table 7.3 One-earner couple aged 50 with sickness or disability benefits 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
SICKNESS       
Denmark I  78  62 49 39  33
Denmark II  106  84 67 53  45
Finland 90  90 89 80  74
Great Britain  100  100 100 100  100
Italy 73  72 76 74  74
The Netherlands  100  100 100 100  100
Spain 61  64 69 70  71
Sweden 68  71 73 73  61
DISABILITY    
Denmark I  113  90 72 57  49
Denmark II  158  125 100 80  68
Finland 98  98 98 97  88
Great Britain  77  70 63 48  39
Italy 81  80 83 82  82
The Netherlands  99  92 74 67  70
Spain 110  111 116 121  125
Sweden 125  109 94 86  80
DK I The partner is not available for the labour market. 
DK II The partner is available for the labour market. 
 
 
Table 7.4 Two-earner couple aged 40 with two children aged 3 and 6. Primary  
earner with sickness or disability benefits 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
SICKNESS       
Denmark 96  90 72 63  58
Finland 95  93 88 85  83
Great Britain  100  100 100 100  100
Italy 86  83 83 83  84
The Netherlands  100  100 100 100  100
Spain 74  79 82 82  82
Sweden 90  90 85 84  77
DISABILITY    
Denmark 118  100 79 68  61
Finland 97  94 87 83  83
Great Britain  90  85 67 54  46
Italy 92  89 89 88  89
The Netherlands  74  76 77 78  80
Spain 107  111 115 117  120
Sweden 106  102 88 88  88
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Table 7.5 Two-earner couple aged 40 with two children aged 3 and 6. Secondary  
earner with sickness or disability benefits 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
SICKNESS       
Denmark 96  91 83 79  76
Finland 96  94 92 92  92
Great Britain  100  100 100 100  100
Italy 93  90 91 90  91
The Netherlands  100  100 100 100  100
Spain 87  90 88 88  90
Sweden 94  93 91 92  92
DISABILITY    
Denmark 127  115 101 93  88
Finland 91  86 76 68  61
Great Britain  91  90 78 75  74
Italy 97  93 94 93  94
The Netherlands  86  86 86 88  88
Spain 103  108 111 114  117
Sweden 119  106 95 94  94
 
Table 7.6 Two-earner couple aged 40 with two children aged 3 and 6. Both earners  
with sickness or disability benefits 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
SICKNESS       
Denmark 93  87 69 56  47
Finland 91  89 83 77  75
Great Britain  100  100 100 100  100
Italy 79  77 77 74  74
The Netherlands  100  100 100 100  100
Spain 61  67 70 70  72
Sweden 84  83 79 77  69
DISABILITY    
Denmark 138  118 94 76  63
Finland 91  86 76 68  61
Great Britain  76  73 58 46  37
Italy 84  83 83 82  83
The Netherlands  60  62 64 66  68
Spain 110  114 118 120  123
Sweden 114  101 84 82  82
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The calculations of this study refer to the concept of the average production worker, defined 
by the OECD: the APW, whose gross wage represents the income derived from the same 
work functions in all countries. The APW is a full-time worker in the manufacturing industry, 
with no sickness or unemployment and average overtime. This is a well-established yardstick 
for international comparisons, although not without shortcomings. Going up or down from the 
APW income level may give results which are not so easy to identify in terms of specific 
groups on the labour market. However, some of the lower levels can be interpreted as part 
time work at APW hourly wages. This could be the interpretation for the secondary earner 
spouse in the two-earner couple. Anyhow, income variation is useful in tracking possible 
incentive problems in relation to work. Income levels of 67, 80, 100, 125 and 150 per cent of 
the APW level have been chosen in this study just to give a reasonably broad income interval. 
In the two-earner couple, the secondary earner spouse is assumed to earn half of the income of 




A substantial variation in family types is also necessary to get an impression of how social 
events such as sickness or unemployment affect different families. In this study, the single 
person, the single parent, the one-earner couple without children and the two-earner couple 
with children (except in the retirement situation) have been chosen. These types do not cover 




The income concept used for calculations of the in-work and the out-of-work situations is 
important. The standard OECD concept is the take home pay concept or extensions of this. In 
its basic form, take home pay is gross wage minus personal taxes and employee paid social 
contributions. Inclusion of benefits for children and housing extends the concept to the usual 
concept of disposable income. In this study, the concept is further refined: the take home pay 
is the basis, and benefits for children and housing are added, then the housing costs are 
subtracted to derive the family purse income concept. It reflects what is disposable for the 
family when housing has been paid for.  
 
Small net replacement rates on the basis of the family purse income, e.g. in activation of 
young unemployed, can thus indicate, that it is not sustainable to keep on living in costly 
accommodation, but it is necessary to move to a cheaper flat. Using the usual disposable 
income concept may miss this point. On the other hand, large replacement rates according to 
the family purse concept can be a result of the comparison of small family purses in two 
different situations, both of which may be at a non-sustainable level. It is therefore necessary 
to assess the nominal value of the family purses as well. 
 
As an example on implications from different income concepts the situation for the Danish 
single parent (2 children) in work and in unemployment (insured) at APW income level is 
illustrated according to the usual disposable income concept and the family purse income 
concept.  
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Annex table 1 Net replacement rates for different income concepts 
  In work In unemployment
Gross income  285 000 148 000
 - Personal taxation  125 840 51 766
Basic take home pay  159 160 96 434
 + Child benefits  53 628 53 628
 + Housing benefits  4 660 22 644
Disposable income   217 448 172 706
 - Housing costs  57 000 57 000
Family purse   160 448 115 706
Net replacement rate based on the disposable income concept  79 %
Net replacement rate based on the Family purse concept  72 %
A single Danish parent with two children at APW income level is used in the example 
 
The disposable income concept results, as should be expected, in a higher replacement rate 
than when the family purse concept is applied. If the situation at 1.5 APW income is 
illustrated, the difference between the results of the two income concepts increases and the 
two replacement rates will be 65 per cent and 55 per cent respectively. There is no change in 
income in the unemployment situation, but the in-work income increases, and the deduction 





When more composed calculations are made, including housing costs and housing benefits, it 
is necessary to make assumptions concerning housing costs. This is not easy and there is 
probably no best way to do this in the context of international comparisons. A relatively 
simple approach was selected for this study. For families with one income, 20 per cent of the 
gross APW wage was selected as gross housing costs (15 per cent of which are operating 
costs such as electricity, heating etc.), and for families with two incomes, 30 per cent of the 
same basis was selected (15 per cent of which as operating costs). Other procedures can easily 
be justified, e.g. varying housing costs in accordance with varying income. This has not been 
done here; the housing costs are fixed for each family type, disregarding income level. 
 
All the countries participating in the study followed this approach. The implication is that 
housing costs constitute the following share of the gross family income for all the family 
types. The housing cost share at different income levels in per cent of APW income is 
illustrated in the following table. 
 
  0.67 APW  0.8 APW APW 1.25 APW  1.5 APW
Housing cost  30%  25% 20% 16%  13%
 
For the two-earner couple the secondary earner has half of this income. 
 
Housing cost matters, especially in the family purse concept. It is not claimed that housing 
costs are identical for the seven countries following the simple approach, but they are 
calculated according to a common procedure and the results are comparable between all 
countries.  




To illustrate the importance of housing costs a simple sensitivity analysis is presented in the 
following. Danish cases are used, in alternative I a low housing cost is used (20 or 30 per cent 
of the 100 per cent APW gross wage depending on family type) and in alternative II a high 
housing cost is used (25, 30 or 40 per cent of the 100 per cent APW depending on family 
type). 
 
Impact on net replacement rates from varying housing cost assumptions. Income level is 67 
per cent of APW income. 
 
  Alt. I Alt. II
Single, unemployment benefit  74 (20%) 67 (25%)
Single parent, unemployment benefit  89 (20%) 85 (25%)
One-earner couple, unemployment benefit  106 (20%) 164 (30%)
Two-earner couple, unemployment benefit  93 (30%) 91 (40%)
 
When housing costs are lower the replacement rates are usually higher, except for 
replacement rates above 100 per cent, where it is the other way round. The one-earner couple 
with high housing costs is one case where the family purse income is quite low. The effects 
are not dramatic, except for the one-earner couple. In the Danish cases above, ordinary 
housing benefit and housing allowance from the social assistance scheme are included and 
have an impact on the result. 
 